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THE FAILURE OF "SORRY': AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF
APOLOGY LAWS, HEALTH CARE, AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
by
Benjaminj McMichael*
As part of the effort to contain the size and frequency of medical malprac-
tice claims, many states have adopted apology laws. These laws make
apologies from physicians to patients inadmissible in any subsequent
court proceedings. The basic rationale behind apology laws is that merit-
less malpractice claims are less likely to be filed when a physician can
apologize to his or her patient without risking those statements being used
in court. Through the use of a unique dataset, this Article corrects sever-
al misunderstandings concerning this new generation of tort reform.
First, it shows that while apology laws may reduce the frequency and size
of malpractice claims as intended, they may also have a perverse effect on
patients' propensity to litigate. If a physician knows more about whether
a patient's injury was caused by malpractice than the patient, an apolo-
gy could alert the patient to that malpractice and encourage the filing of
a claim.
Second, the Article provides the first empirical analysis of the effect of
apology laws on clinical outcomes, investigating their ability to reduce
the practice of defensive medicine. Examining over 1.6 million hospital
stays for heart attack patients, the Article finds no evidence that apology
laws reduce defensive medicine. Apology laws do not decrease the intensi-
ty of treatment received by patients. In fact, they increase the medical re-
sources used to treat heart attack patients, consistent with an increase in
defensive medicine. Based on these empirical findings, the Article con-
cludes that apology laws are not effective tort reforms and that states
should look to other policies if they wish to achieve the goals of apology
laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal and psychological research has consistently demonstrated the
value of apologies in legal contexts, finding that apologies can assuage
the anger and soothe the aggression felt by victims following an injury,
start the healing process for those victims, and restore prior relation-
ships.' Beyond the important restorative and therapeutic benefits apolo-
See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 1, 107 (2004) ("Apologies have the power to
heal humiliations and grudges, remove the desire for vengeance, and generate
forgiveness on the part of the offended parties."); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted:
Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28
Sw. U. L. REv. 221, 241 (1999) ("[A]pologies can transform individuals and
regenerate relationships."); see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 88-90 (2004);
Susan Daicoff, Apology, Forgiveness, Reconciliation & Therapeutic justice, 13 PEPP. Disp.
RESOL. L.J. 131, 134 (2013); Ken'ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its
Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALIY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
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gies have for victims, apologies can-by reducing victims' desire for vin-
dication-decrease the propensity of victims to file suit, facilitate quicker
settlements, and encourage parties to settle for smaller amounts. Despite
the benefits of apologies, potential defendants have historically been
counseled against apologizing because apologies themselves may be evi-
dence of wrongdoing, and thus may increase the likelihood that victims
seek legal redress, and improve victims' chances of prevailing in legal
disputes. Thus, the paradox of apologies: apologizing may facilitate dis-
pute resolution and reduce a party's overall risk from litigation, but a
wrongdoer may be hesitant to apologize out of fear of future liability.
To address this paradox, state legislatures have passed apology laws,4
which are designed to facilitate apolo ies by reducing or eliminating the
risk of apologizing for the wrongdoer. More specifically, apology laws are
reforms to state evidentiary codes that prohibit a plaintiff from introduc-
ing into evidence a statement of apology, sympathy, or condolence by the
defendant.6 In theory, once the defendant no longer fears the use of an
apology against her at trial, she becomes free to apologize to the plaintiff,
thereby generating all of the benefits of apologies while avoiding the
costs. Although apology laws are formally changes to state rules of evi-
dence, these laws function primarily as tort reforms.! Indeed, Yonathan
Arbel and Yotam Kaplan recently noted that, "despite appearances, apol-
ogy laws are de-facto tort reform."' Moreover, as with other, more familiar
219, 221 (1989).
2 SeeJeffrey S. Helmreich, Does 'Sony'Incriminate? Evidence, Harm and the Protection
of Apology, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 567, 567 (2012) ("Apology has proven a
dramatically effective means of resolving conflict and preventing litigation."); Carol
B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure of
Errors and Adverse Events to Patients, 23 HEALTH AFF. 22, 29 (2004).
3 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical
Examination, 102 MIcH. L. REv. 460, 467 (2003) ("[A]ttorneys and others fear that any
apology will be admitted into evidence as an admission of fault. Consequently, some
clients are hesitant to apologize. Likewise, lawyers and insurance companies may be
unlikely to advise their clients to apologize or to make any statement that could be
construed as an apology. In fact, they may actively discourage such statements.").
' See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Medical Liability Climate and Prospects for Reform,
312 J. Ass'N 2146, 2151 (2014) (discussing apology laws as a new type of reform
effort).
See id.
6 See Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sony Work? The Impact of Apology Laws on
Medical Malpractice, 43 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 142 (2011).
See id. at 144 (treating apology laws as tort reforms); Benjamin Ho & Elaine
Liu, What's an Apology Worth? Decomposing the Effect of Apologies on Medical Malpractice
Payments Using State Apology Laws, 8 J. EMPIRIcAL L. STUD. 179, 186 (2011); see also
Yonathan Arbel & Yotam Kaplan, Tort Reform through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and
Apologies, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2017) (arguing that the public should view
apology laws as tort reforms).
8 Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1201.
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tort reforms, the stated goals of apology laws include reducing the risk
that a lawsuit will be filed and encouraging the quick resolution of those
suits that are filed." To say that the debate over tort reform remains con-
tentious would be an understatement, and though apology laws have en-
gendered less vitriol than other tort reforms, these laws have staunch ad-
vocates on both sides of the debate.o
The discussion of apologies and apology laws has influenced policy
changes in relatively short order, with 39 states adopting an apology law
between 1999 and 2015." In fact, apology laws now outstrip more famil-
iar tort reforms such as noneconomic damages caps in popularity among
states.2 While the merits of apologies have been discussed in a variety of
contexts,' apology laws are primarily -directed -at medical -malpractice,
with a majority of enacted apology laws applying only to actions against
health care providers. Apology laws have even received attention at the
federal level with then-Senators Barrack Obama and Hillary Clinton in-
troducing legislation that included a federal apology law as one way to
address high levels of medical malpractice litigation.' Accordingly, this
Article focuses squarely on medical malpractice. Beyond the fact that
medical malpractice is clearly the target of apology laws, it is an im-
portant context in which to investigate these laws because it has the po-
tential to add significant costs to an already expensive health care sys-
tem,'0 and because it has been a salient locus for the tort reform debate
over the last 40 years." Moreover, since prior work has focused on this
9 See infta Part II.B.
'o See Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1211-15 (discussing the legislative
landscape of apology laws and tort reforms); see also Rogan Kersh, Medical Malpractice
and the New Politics of Health Care, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 43, 49-63 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006) (discussing the politics
of tort reform generally).
" See Benjamin J. McMichael et al., Sony is Never Enough: The Effect of State Apology
Laws on Medical Malpractice Liability Risk, 71 STAN. L. Rrv. 13 (forthcoming 2018)
(listing the states that have adopted apology laws).
* Id. at 47.
" See Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1201; Erin A. O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On
Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1121, 1124 (2002).
14 See Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 144 ("California, Massachusetts, Florida,
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington have general apology statutes that apply across all
industries while the other 30 States have specific laws that only protect the statements
of apology made by health care providers.").
" See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barrack Obama, Making Patient Safety the
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2206 (2006)
(discussing their proposal).
1 See Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1569 (2010) ("Overall annual medical liability system costs,
including defensive medicine, are estimated to be $55.6 billion in 2008 dollars, or 2.4
percent of total health care spending.").
" See DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
1202 [Vol. 22:4
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area, it is possible to directly compare apology laws with other tort re-
forms.
Despite the widespread interest in apology laws and the fact that the
ongoing debate over apology laws has demonstrated the capability to
generate real policy change,' two important problems persist. First, the
debate has become muddled, with state legislatures often conflating
apology laws with apologies more generally and failing to treat apology
laws as tort reforms, even though these laws are justified along the same
lines as other tort reforms, are designed to achieve similar goals, and-
like other reforms-are limited to medical malpractice.m This lack of
consideration of apology laws in a tort reform context is problematic be-
cause states only evaluate apology laws in the narrow context of their abil-
ity to encourage apologies and, less commonly, their ability to reduce the
-number and size of malpractice claims. The effect of apology laws on the
health care system more generally has been almost completely ignored,
even though this effect is one of the most hotly debated points of conten-
20
tion with respect to other tort reforms. Second and relatedly, in a recent
comprehensive report prepared for the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, two leading scholars noted that "l[v] ery limited evidence ex-
ists on the effect of apology laws on liability and clinical outcomes."2 In
other words, even if lawmakers wanted to evaluate the effect of apology
laws on the health care system, they lack the evidence necessary to do so.
This Article makes two main contributions to address each of these
problems in the ongoing debate over apology laws. First, it provides clari-
ty to this debate by explicitly situating apology laws in the tort reform
context. Importantly, this discussion of apology laws as tort reforms
demonstrates that, in addition to working as they are intended and gen-
erating all of the benefits associated with apologies, apology laws may
have Ververse effects and actually increase the risk of liability for physi-
cians. Second, this Article provides the first empirical evaluation of the
effect of apology laws on clinical outcomes by examining these laws' in-
COMMISSIoN ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) (detailing an early investigation into
the role of medical malpractice).
" Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1211 ("Much to the envy of legal scholars
everywhere, the Legal Apologists have had a tremendous impact on policy.").
" See infra Part I.B.
2 See infra Part II.A.
21 MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: EVIDENCE ON
REFORM ALTERNATIVES AND CLAIMS INvOLvING ELDERLY PATIENTS 91 (2016),
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/decl 6_medicalmalpractice
medpac.contractor.pdf; see also Michelle M. Mello et al., Medical Liability-Prospects for
Federal Reform, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1806, 1807 (2017) (noting that "insufficient
evidence" exists to evaluate the effects of apology laws).
2 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 155 (explaining that apology laws may have
"unintended consequences").
2018] 1203
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fluence on physicians' practice of defensive medicine.2 Because the ef-
fects of apology laws as tort reforms are theoretically ambiguous, an em-
pirical investigation is necessary to provide a clear picture of the role that
these laws play in the health care system. To date, the only rigorous em-
pirical analyses of apology laws have focused solely on the effects of these
laws on medical malpractice settlements and damages awards, not on
24
clinical outcomes. Thus, the analysis presented here addresses the pre-
viously identified lack of evidence on clinical outcomes and fills a signifi-
cant gap in the current understanding of apology laws.
To better understand apology laws beyond the courtroom, I use a
nationally representative dataset of over 1.6 million hospital stays be-
tween 1999 and 2011 to analyze the effects of these laws on the treatment
decisions of physicians caring for heart attack patients. Historically, car-
diology and cardiothoracic surgeries have been at high risk for medical
malpractice lawsuits, and physicians practicing in these specialties have
practiced defensive medicine. Thus, cardiac care is an excellent context
in which to evaluate the effects of apology laws on defensive medicine.
Equally important, the availability of data on over 1.6 million hospital
stays, which represent one out of every four heart attacks that occurred
over a 13-year period, allows me to develop sound empirical evidence
and draw robust conclusions about the role of apology laws in the care
26
received by patients. For each heart attack patient, I am able to observe:
the treatment received, up to 15 additional diagnoses beyond the heart
attack, how long the patient remained in the hospital, the cost of the pa-
tient's hospital stay, and a variety of various characteristics of the treating
hospital. This information provides a nearly exhaustive view of the care
" Physicians practice defensive medicine when they perform tests or procedures
primarily for the purpose of avoiding future malpractice claims and not because
those tests or procedures are medically necessary. See David M. Studdert et al.,
Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice
Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2609, 2609 (2005) (discussing defensive
medicine). Defensive medicine has the potential to cause individual patients
unnecessary pain and expense and to add substantial costs-often estimated in the
tens of billions-to an already expensive health care system. See Kenneth D.
Illingworth et al., The Impact of Tort Reform and Quality Improvements on Medical Liability
Claims: A Tale of 2 States, 30 AM.J. MED. QUALTY 263, 263 (2015) (estimating the cost
of defensive medicine to be $50 billion). Part II.A.3 infra discusses defensive
medicine in detail.
21 See Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 141; Ho & Liu, supra note 7, at 179; McMichael
et al., supra note 11, at 11-12.
25 Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111
Q.J. EcoN. 353, 363, 368 (1996); David M. Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics
ofPhysicians Prone to Malpractice Claims, 374 NEw ENG.J. MED. 354, 357 (2016).
" Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Intensity of
Treatment: Evidence from Heart Patients, 39J. HEALTH ECON. 273, 276 (2015) (examining
similar data as that analyzed here and estimating that approximately 25% of all heart
attacks are included in the data).
1204 [Vol. 22:4
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received by individual patients, which in turn provides a complete view of
the effects of apology laws.
In general, I find no evidence that physicians change the types of
treatment that heart attack patients receive and thus no evidence that
apology laws reduce the practice of defensive medicine. This stands in
stark contrast to the effect of noneconomic damages caps; for the same
population of patients, these reduce the provision of more medically in-
tensive treatments." However,- I find consistent evidence that apology
laws induce longer stays in the hospital, which is consistent with greater
resource use and defensive medicine more generally." I also find some
evidence that apology laws increase the mortality risk faced by heart at-
29
tack patients; thus, longer hospital stays do not benefit patients.
Based on the results of the empirical analysis, I argue that apology
laws fail as tort reforms, as they do not reduce, and indeed increase, the
practice of defensive medicine. I also explore why apology laws may have
this perverse and counterintuitive effect. Specifically, the evidence sug-
gests that these laws encourage physicians to deliver ineffective apologies
that signal the occurrence of malpractice to patients who otherwise
would not have discovered it. In this way, apology laws can increase phy-
sicians' risk of facing malpractice claims and, in turn, encourage the in-
creased practice of defensive medicine. Based on the propensity of apol-
ogy laws to increase the practice of defensive medicine, I make two
recommendations. First, state legislatures hould look to alternative re-
forms if they desire to accomplish the goals of tort reform, such as the
reduction of medical malpractice claims and the practice of defensive
medicine. Second, individual physicians should not apologize unless they
have received the training necessary to do so effectively-training that
does not accompany the passage of apology laws.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Section I discusses
the interpersonal and societal benefits of apologies and the formalization
of apologies through apology laws. Section II discusses apology laws in a
tort reform context and explains how these laws may benefit patients and
what factors may cause apology laws to have unintended consequences,
such as an increase in litigation. Section III empirically investigates the
effects of apology laws on physician treatment decisions and other clini-
cal outcomes. Section IV discusses the policy implications of this empiri-
cal analysis and makes specific recommendations based on that analysis.
2 Id.
2' As discussed in greater detail below, length of stay is often used in the medical
literature as a proxy for resource use associated with a particular patient. See infra Part
III.B.
2 See infra Part III.E.
2018] 1205
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I. APOLOGIES AND APOLOGY LAWS
Prior work on apologies and apology laws has focused primarily on
the ability of the latter to achieve the benefits associated with the former.
While this remains an important line of inquiry, it is important to recog-
nize that apologies in a legal context and apology laws are distinct. Accord-
ingly, this section provides an overview of the benefits of apologies in a
legal context before separately tracing the development of apology laws.
A. The Benefits of "Sony "
Though hard to define with exacting specificity, "apologies are de-
scribed generally as admissions of blameworthiness and regret for doing
harm.,s While most people likely understand intuitively the value of
apologies in their personal interactions, psychological and legal research
has documented benefits of apologies that extend well beyond everyday
interactions.3 First, a number of scholars have expounded on the thera-
peutic benefits of apologies in general. Second, within the context of liti-
gation, research has demonstrated that apologies can reduce the likeli-
hood of claims, shorten settlement times, lower settlement amounts, and
generally facilitate dispute resolution.
1. Apologies and Reparative Discourse: The Therapeutic Effects of "Sony"
Psychological research has demonstrated that apologies can soothe
the aggression that victims feel following a harm.2 In general, following
"a heartfelt apology, victims ... report feeling a near instantaneous ero-
sion of anger and pain.",3 Research on the effects of apologies has found
that, by apologizinE, the offender acknowledges her fault and recognizes
the victim's harm. In doing so, the offender alters how the victim at-
tributes the cause of the negative action to the offender, thereby mollify-
ing the anger and aggression a victim typically experiences following a
3 O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 13, at 1131-32; see also Aaron Lazare, The Healing
Forces ofApology in Medical Practice and Beyond, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 251, 255 (2008) ("An
apology, in its simplest terms, is an acknowledgement of responsibility for an offense
coupled with an expression of remorse.").
" See Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1207 n.28 (reporting that 326 articles have
addressed apologies in the legal literature alone); see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen,
Apologies as Intellectual Property Remedies: Lessons from China, 44 CONN. L. REv. 883, 891
(2012) ("In the last two decades, apology legal scholarship has become increasingly
robust.").
32 Ohbuchi et al., supra note 1, at 221, 222.
" O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 13, at 1124.
34 See LAZARE, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the role that acknowledgement
plays in apologies); see also Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology,
109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1136-37 (2000) (relating the story of the anger a young woman
felt after the physicians who negligently caused the death of her husband failed to
apologize).
[Vol. 22:41206
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harm." Even though an apology implies a level of culpability, psychologi-
cal experiments have consistently found that an apology nevertheless
causes a victim to reduce her attribution of fault to the offender and in-
creases the perception that the reasons for the harm were outside of the
offender's control.36
In addition to soothing aggression and assuaging anger, apologies
can serve broader purposes. For example, Susan Daicoff has explained
that "[a]pology, forgiveness, and reconciliation can have great benefits
by reducing ... negative emotions and improving the potential for indi-
vidual reform .... [and] can maximize the therapeutic aspects of legal
matters and minimize the anti-therapeutic ones for wrongdoers and af-
fected persons alike."7 Daicoff further noted that apologizing can foster
therapeutic guilt within the wrongdoer (which can motivate future
changes in behavior), allow victims to release anger in a healthy manner,
18
facilitate victims' movements through the grief process, and "begin to
restore to the harmed person what was taken away by the apologizer's
acts."
In the realm of medical malpractice, Aaron Lazare has explained
that apologies can be particularly important because "there is so much at
stake-such as the patient's functioning and survival-[and] time is pre-
cious."'o An apology from a physician to a patient can serve many healing
functions, including allowing the patient to "feel[] cared for," facilitating
the "[r]estoration of self-respect and dignity," encouraging the
"[r]estoration of power," acknowledging the "[s]uffering in the offend-
er" (i.e., the physician), and "[a]ssur[ing] . . . shared values.""' When
physicians, who often serve in positions of great trust, commit errors that
result in harm to patients, the experience can prove incrediblyjarring. In
this setting, apologies can be particularly important as a means to begin
the healing process.
Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALYY 281,
308 (1991).
" For an in-depth discussion of this paradoxical effect of apologies and the
experiments demonstrating it, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and
Reasonableness: Some Implications of Psychology for Torts, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 489, 492
(2010).
Daicoff, supra note 1, at 143.
Id. at 144-49.
* Id. at 149; see also Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 1, at 90 (arguing that
"[a]pology ... is a powerful ritual for offenders, victims, and communities" and that
apologies can serve to refocus the legal system on "constructive measures to heal
offenders, victims, and communities"); id. at 103 (noting that apologies can play an
important role in "restorative justice").
4 Lazare, supra note 30, at 264.
" Id. at 263.
12072018]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
2. Apologies and Litigation: The Role of "Sorry" in Dispute Resolution
The benefits of apologies outside of litigation have been well-
documented, and many of these have the potential to facilitate dispute
resolution. In general, apologies can affect legal disputes through several
different avenues." Psychological research has demonstrated that the
course of a dispute can be influenced by how those involved perceive
that dispute.43 Prior work has also found that the course of a dispute de-
pends on factors such as whether the injured party feels. she has.been
treated fairly and whether she attributes causation and fault to the of-
fender." Apologies can affect perceptions of the dispute and these other
relevant factors by influencing how participants interpret "fair versus un-
fair treatment, attributions of responsibility, and--perceived dignity vis-;!-
vis the wrongdoer," thereby "lead [ing] to greater willingness to settle
claims and greater satisfaction with outcomes.",5
A number of explanations for the positive effects of apologies on
disputes have been advanced over the years. For example, one reason vic-
tims may be less likely to pursue a dispute following an apology is that
they infer from the apology that the cause of the underlying incident is
less stable and that, therefore, the incident is less likely to be repeated.
Victims often report that they pursue lawsuits not to receive compensa-
tion but to change the injurer's behavior in the future, thus preventing
future harm.4 7 If Victims pursue litigation in order to ensure that the
harmful actions will not recur, then victims' perceptions of apologies as
indicators that the harmful actions are less likely to be repeated suggests
that apologies would increase settlements and decrease litigious behavior
42 Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 477 ("[R]esearch on the factors that lead injured
parties to instigate and pursue legal claims suggests several avenues by which an
apology might influence settlement behavior."); see also, e.g., Mark Bennett &
Deborah Earwaker, Victim's Response to Apologies: The Effects of Offender Responsibility and
Offense Severity, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 457, 457 (1994); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard
Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a
Transgression, 22 BAsic & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 291, 291 (2000); Holley S. Hodgins &
Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents and Consequences, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 297, 313 (2003); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato,
Children's Reactions to Mitigating Accounts, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1994); Steven J.
Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the
Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIc REs. 127, 127 (1997).
4 Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 477.
4 Id.
4 Id.
46 See Gold & Weiner, supra note 42, at 291-92.
4 Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the
Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1001, 1006 (2003); Gerald B. Hickson
et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Prenatal
Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1359, 1359 (1992); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People
Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 IANCET 1609, 1609
(1994).
[Vol. 22:41208
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by victims.4 8 Another explanation for why apologies may increase settle-
ments and facilitate dispute resolution more generally comes from equity
theory. According to this theory, the injury inflicted on the victim by the
wrongdoer creates an inequity, or moral imbalance, in their relation-
ship. Individuals are motivated to restore equity to inequitable relation-
ships, and one way to achieve this restoration is an apology.o These two
theories are not the only ones that have been advanced in the context of
apologies and litigation, but what they have in common with other theo-
ries and explanations is that apologies generally facilitate dispute resolu-
tion and decrease litigation.5 '
Experimental and empirical research has generally borne out these
theoretical predictions. Jennifer Robbennolt conducted a series of stud-
ies in which participants assumed the perspective of the victim and were
52
asked to evaluate a settlement offer from the injurer. She found that
victims who received an apology were more likel v to have a favorable view
of the injurer and to accept a settlement offer. Studies focusing specifi-
cally on health care and medical malpractice have yielded similar results.
For example, Kathleen Mazor and others examined patients' responses
54
to medical errors in an experimental setting. Members of a health care
plan were provided with vignettes describing a medical error and the
4 Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 481-82.
" Id. at 477; see generally Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25J.
PERS. & SOc. PSYCHOL. 151 (1973).
* Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 477; Walster, supra note 49, at 163.
For examples of other theories, see Orenstein, supra note 1, at 241
("[A]pologies can transform individuals and regenerate relationships."); NICHOLAS
TAvuCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY 13 (1991) ("An apology thus speaks
to an act that cannot be undone but that cannot go unnoticed without compromising
the current and future relationship of the parties, the legitimacy of the violated rule,
and the wider social web in which the participants are enmeshed.").
5' See also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 148 (1994) (finding that,
when asked to evaluate a settlement offer by a hypothetical landlord, hypothetical
tenants were marginally more likely to accept the offer of settlement when the
landlord apologized).
" See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 489 (noting that hypothetical victims who
received an apology were more likely to accept a settlement offer); Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 333, 333 (2006)
("[A] pologies can promote settlement by altering the injured parties' perceptions of
the situation and the offender so as to make them more amenable to settlement
discussions and by altering the values of the injured parties' settlement levers in ways
that are likely to increase the chances of settlement.").
' Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views About Disclosure of Medical
Errors, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 409 (2004); see also Kathleen M. Mazor et al.,
Health Plan Members' Views on Forgiving Medical Errors, 11 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 49, 49
(2005) [hereinafter Mazor et al., Forgiving Medical Errors].
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physician's response to that error. In the hypothetical, the physician ei-
ther denied responsibility and offered little information or took respon-
sibility for the error and offered detailed information on steps that would
be taken to prevent similar errors in the future. Participants who read
the vignette in which the physician took responsibility responded that
they would be less likely to seek legal advice regarding the medical error,
and nearly 90% of participants reported that, in the event of an error,
they would prefer that the physician say she was "sincerely sorry."
Similarly, other studies relying on experiments and surveys in the
medical malpractice context have found that individuals are less likely to
pursue a claim against a physician following a medical error if the physi-
cian proffers an apology.- Amy Witman, Deric Park, and Steven Hardin
found that "patients were significantly more likely to either report or sue
the physician when he or she failed to acknowledge the mistake."5 8 A sub-
sequent study found that approximately 30% of survey respondents re-
ported that a full apology and explanation could have prevented them
from suing their physicians.5 Perhaps the most well-known study in this
area was conducted by Gerald Hickson and his colleagues.0 In one of the
first studies to empirically document that remuneration was not neces-
sarily the primary reason individuals file malpractice claims, Hickson et
al. noted that "24% [of patients] indicated that they filed when they real-
ized that physicians had failed to be completely honest with them about
what happened," which was the same percentage of patients that indicat-
ed they filed a claim because they needed money to care for the injuries
61
caused by medical errors.
Beyond experimental studies, other evidence has confirmed that,
when implemented as part of hospital- or system-wide programs, apolo-
gies can reduce both the frequency and average size of medical malprac-
62
tice claims. For example, after studying Pennsylvania hospitals, Carol
" Mazor et al., Forgiving Medical Errors, supra note 54, at 49-51.
Id. at 49-51.
5 Id. at 50.
5 Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A
Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 Archives of Internal Med.
2565, 2573 (1996); see also Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues TheirDoctors?
How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 105, 110, 116 (1990)
(reporting similar findings).
" Vincent et al., supra note 47, at 1612.
6 Hickson et al., supra note 47, at 1359.
6 Id. at 1361.
62 See, e.g., Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty
May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963, 963-64 (1999) (noting that,
after it implemented an investigation, disclosure, and apology program, a Veteran's
Affairs hospital in Kentucky enjoyed financial savings); CAROL B. LIEBMAN & CHRIS
STERN HYMAN, MEDIcAL ERROR DISCLOSURE, MEDIATION SKILLS, AND MALPRACTICE
LrnGATION: A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT IN PENNSYLVANIA 7, http://citeseerx.
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Liebman and Chris Hyman concluded that " [o]pen communication and
mediation that offers emotional as well as financial satisfaction hold the
promise of addressing both problems in a way that is fair to doctors, pa-
tients, and families."63 One specific and well-studied apology and disclo-
sure program was implemented at the University of Michigan Health Sys-
tem. One study that examined this program found that the number of
monthly claims, i.e., demands for compensation, decreased by 36% and
that the number of lawsuits fell by 65% relative to pre-implementation
64
rates. Of the claims and lawsuits that were still asserted, the hospital
saved nearly 60% in compensation paid out to claimants and saw its
mean lawsuit costs fall from just over $400,000 to just over $225,000.5 A
later study of the Michigan program found that payments to claimants
decreased by 47% and that the time to resolution decreased from nearly
two years to only six months." Yet another study concerning this program
found a statistically significant reduction in the number of patient en-
counters resulting in a claim, the average payment per claim, and the
time to resolution of a claim.
While these "programs, typically implemented at well-resourced aca-
demic medical centers, have reported substantially lower malpractice
claims and costs," their results may not be generalizable, given their
somewhat unique medical settings." Efforts to generalize apology and
disclosure programs are ongoing, such as the Agency for Health Care Re-
search and Quality's CANDOR toolkit." However, this toolkit, like all
hospital-specific programs, still requires that institutions take affirmative
steps to implement it, limiting its generalizability."o On the other hand,
ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.596.1143&rep=repl&type=pdf.
" LIEBMAN & HYMAN, supra note 62, at 7; see also Liebman & Hyman, supra note 2,
at 23, 28. At the time of the study, Pennsylvania had not enacted an apology law.
' Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 213 (2010). Michigan
did not pass an apology law until 201 1-one year after this study was published.
* Id. at 217.
Richard C. Boothman, et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims?:
The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH LIFE Sci. L. 125, 143 (2009).
6 Megan A. Adams et al., Effect of a Health System's Medical Error Disclosure Program
on Gastroenterology-Related Claims Rates and Costs, 109 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 460,
460 (2014) (finding that cases were resolved 26% faster).
6 Ho & Liu, supra note 7, at 181 ("For example, these aforementioned hospitals
could be under the management of reforming administrators, or may have other
concurrent programs (e.g., full information disclosure program at University of
Michigan Health Services); therefore, the reduction in claim frequency or payout
could be attributed to factors besides the apology program.").
0 See Communication and Optimal Resolution (CANDOR) Toolkit, AHRQ
(Sept. 2017), https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patient-safety-
resources/resources/candor/introduction.html.
7o See Implementation Guide for the CANDOR Process, AHRQ (Apr. 2016), https://
www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patient-safety-resources/
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apology laws, which are discussed in the next section, apply to every
health care provider in states that have enacted them.
B. Legalizing "Sorry ": The Rapid Development ofApology Laws
Apology laws are states' attempts to generate the benefits of apolo-
gies across their entire health care systems. The reasoning that underlies
these laws is straightforward." Physicians (and other providers) could
avoid some malpractice disputes and attenuate the severity of those dis-
putes that do occur by apologizing. However, physicians avoid apologiz-
ing because they believe (or have been counseled) that doing so could
expose them to increased risk of liability since an apology would general-
ly be admissible as evidence of liability (as an admission against inter-
est).72 Apology laws, in theory, eliminate this risk by rendering a physi-
cian's apology inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent malpractice
proceeding.
However, not all apology laws are created equally, and these laws can
be broadly categorized as either "partial apology laws" or "full apology
laws."7 Partial apology laws protect statements of sympathy, condolence,
and apology, but they do not protect statements admitting fault, error, or
resources/candor/impguide.html.
71 See, e.g., Evidence: Inadmissibility of Apologies: Hearing on Assemb. B. 2804 Before the
Assemh. COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Cal. 2000) (statement of Sheila James Kuehl, Chair,
Assemb. Comm. On Judiciary) (noting in reference to California's apology law that
"[t]he author introduced this bill in an attempt to reduce lawsuits and encourage
settlements by fostering the use of apologies in connection with accident-related
injuries or death"); see also, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, Rule 409.5 (West 2018)
("The rule favors expressions of sympathy as embodying desirable social interactions
and contributing to civil settlements . . . .").
72 Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 467; see Robin E. Ebert, Attorneys, Tell Your Clients
to Say They're Sorry: Apologies in the Health Care Industry, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 337, 338
(2008) ("Apologizing in the wake of a medical error, however, is not a common
practice among physicians."); see also Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849, 850 (Vt. 1992)
(finding the defendant physician's apology to be admissible as an admission against
interest).
" See TENN. R. EVID. 409.1 advisory committee's note ("The underlying theory of
Rule 409.1 is that a settlement of a lawsuit is more likely if the defendant is free to
express sympathy for the plaintiffs injuries without making a statement hat would be
admissible as an admission of a party opponent. Without this rule, a defendant's
statement such is 'I am sorry that you have suffered so much from the accident'
might well be admissible as an admission of a party opponent. Accordingly, defense
counsel may advise against making such statements in order to avoid the creation of
harmful evidence. Yet a simple apology may go a long way toward making an injured
party feel more comfortable with a nonjudicial settlement of the matter.").
" See Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 145 (using the same terminology). But see
McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 12 (calling "partial apology laws" simply "apology
laws" and "full apology laws" simply "admission laws").
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negligence.7 For example, Virginia's apology law, which is a partial apol-
ogy law, provides that "statements ... expressing sympathy, commisera-
tion, [or] condolence ... together with apologies that are made by the
health care provider ... to the patient. . . shall be inadmissible as evi-
dence of an admission of liability . 7. The law specifically provides that
"[a] statement of fault.. . shall not be made inadmissible . . . ."" On the
other hand, full apology laws protect all of the statements protected by
partial apology laws, but additionally protect statements of fault or liabil-
ity." For example, Georgia's full apology law protects both general
statements of apolo and condolence as well as outright admissions of
"mistake" or "error.'
Since Massachusetts enacted the first (partial) apology law in 1986,0
partial apology laws have proved substantially more popular than their
cousins that offer more protection. Texas enacted the nation's second
partial apology law in 1999, and since that time, 33 states have enacted
their own partial apology laws."' Colorado enacted the first full apology
82
law in 2003, and four more states have since enacted similar laws. Figure
1 provides an overview of the development of apology laws over time, and
Table Al in the Technical Appendix provides a comprehensive listing of
the enactment of apology laws since 1986. As is evident from Figure 1,
only a very small proportion of the population of the United States was
covered by an apology law in 1999, but a substantial majority of Ameri-
cans were subject to such a law by 2011.
Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 146.
76 VA. CODE ANN. tit. 8.01 § 8.01-581.20:1.
7 Id.
78 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 146.
7 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-416 (2018).
" MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 23D (1986).
" Here and throughout this Article, I treat the District of Columbia as a state for
the purposes of apology laws.
12 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 145.
8 All figures and tables with the prefix "A" may be found in the Technical
Appendix.
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cluding that "in some specialties, high premiums [were] forcing physi-
cians to give up performing certain high-risk procedures [and] leaving
,,86
patients without access to a full range of medical services. On the other
hand, the Senators explained that "[i]nstead of focusing on the few areas
of intense disagreement, such as the possibility of mandating caps on the
financial damages awarded to patients, [they] believe [d] that the discus-
sion should center on a more fundamental issue: the need to improve
patient safety."" Their proposal to improve patient safety, as contained in
the MEDiC Bill, included a federal apology law. Specifically, they noted
that "[a] ny apology offered by a health care provider during negotiations
shall be kept confidential and could not be used in any subsequent legal
proceedings as an admission of guilt if those negotiations ended without
mutually acceptable compensation.""
In addition to illustrating the salience of apology laws, the rhetoric
surrounding this bill, which echoed the rhetoric surrounding many state
apology laws, demonstrates that these laws are best understood as a spe-
cies of tort reform. Indeed, Clinton and Obama specifically juxtapose
89apology laws and damages caps in their defense of the MEDiC Bill.
Though the MEDiC Bill failed to pass, the bill's failure does not appear
to have deterred states, with 14 states passing apology laws in the years
following the introduction of the MEDiC Bill.9 0 The rapid development
of apology laws across the country demonstrates the success of the so-
called "legal apologists" in convincing state legislatures of the benefits of
apologies.8 ' However, while the legal apologists have enjoyed success in
state capitols across the country and even attracted the attention of fed-
eral officials who have historically been opposed to tort reform, the
apology law movement has not been without internal divisions. For ex-
ample, one important objection to apology laws is that they negate the
moral value of apologies. Lee Taft explained that an apology "is moral
... because the person who apologizes ... exposes himself to the conse-
quences of his wrongful act." Apology laws, which are specifically de-
signed to eliminate the legal consequences of apologizing, may therefore
strip apologies of their moral meaning.4 In other words, apology laws
6 Clinton & Obama, supra note 15, at 2205.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 2206.
" Id. at 2205.
" Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 145.
" Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1203.
9 Former President Obama has previously stated his opposition to noneconomic
damages caps. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Sept. 11, 2009).
" Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135,
1142 (2000).
" Lee Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1010, 1013 (2005) (arguing that, when an apology lacks consequences,
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may "'cheapen the meaning of an apology,' because the wrongdoer
knows he has nothing to lose by apologizing."9 5 Stripped of their moral
value, some commentators have argued that apologies will be unable to
achieve the individual and social benefits described above9 6 and that
apologies will simply be used as strategic tools to reduce legal risk.97
While this objection illustrates that apology laws are not without
their limitations, these laws have nonetheless been proposed as a new
generation of tort reform that may be able to promote better communi-
cation between patients and physicians, thereby controlling the costs as-
sociated with malpractice liability in the health care system. The next sec-
tion discusses apology laws as a form of tort reform in greater detail.
II. APOLOGY LAWS: TORT REFORMS IN DISGUISE
Following a decade-long lull that roughly coincided with the debate
over the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), tort reform has begun to return to
the forefront of the national health care discussion, with Congress con-
sidering a variety of potential reforms to the health care system recently.99
Perhaps the gold standard of these reforms is a cap on noneconomic
damages, which prevents courts from awarding damages for harms such
as pain and suffering above the cap amount. California spearheaded the
modem movement towards noneconomic damages caps, and other
"damages-centric reforms,"q" beginning in 1975 with its Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA").'m Since these damages-centric re-
"we risk subverting its moral dimension"); see also id. (arguing that only unprotected
apologies can fulfill the moral and ethical purposes of apologies).
9 Ebert, supra note 72, at 364; see also Benjamin Ho, Apologies as Signals: With
Evidence from a Trust Game, 58 MGMT. SCI. 141, 141-43 (2012) (discussing apologies in
the context of "cheap talk").
" Ebert, supra note 72, at 364 ("[P]hysicians who utilize apologies as a means to
manipulate the injured party may engender hostility between the parties, rather than
easing the conflict by offering a genuine expression of sympathy.").
9 See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 13, at 1186 ("[A]pology can be used as a tool for
organizations to strategically take advantage of individual victims' instincts to forgive
in the face of apology.").
' Kimberly Kindy, House GOP Quietly Advances Key Elements of TortReform, WASH.
POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/house-gop-quietly-
advances-key-elements-of-tort-reform/2017/03/09/d52213b2-0414-11e7-ble9-
a05d3c21f7cf story.html?utm-term=.e26c8fdld34a; see also Robert Pear, G.O.P. Bill
Would Make Medical Malpractice Suits Harder to Win, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/us/politics/republicans-health-care-bill-
medical-malpractice-suits.html.
9 By damages-centric reforms, I mean tort reforms that act directly on a court's
ability to impose or apportion damages. Beyond noneconomic damages caps, other
"damages-centric" reforms include caps on punitive damages, caps on total damages,
and reforms to the traditional joint and several liability rule.
i0 For a review of the historical development of tort reforms, see generally
1216 [Vol. 22:4
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forms first became popular in the 1970s and 1980s, states have experi-
mented with other types of reforms.10' Most of these later reforms have
failed to surpass the original reforms in popularity,1 0 2 but apology laws
are an exception to this trend.
While apology laws have outstripped noneconomic damages caps
and other reforms in popularity among state legislatures, their place
within the overall landscape of the tort reform debate remains nebulous
for two important reasons. First, because apology laws are often viewed as
simple measures to encourage apologies, their ability to function as tort
reforms is often overlooked. Second, while traditional damages-centric
reforms have been subject to intense empirical scrutiny over the past
103 104
three decades,0 apology laws have gone largely unexamined. This sec-
tion offers some clarity on the debate over apology laws as tort reforms. It
first discusses the ongoing debate concerning tort reform before examin-
ing how apology laws can function as tort reforms. It then reviews the
scant empirical evidence on apology laws as tort reforms.
A. The Tort Reform Debate
Staunch advocates populate both sides of the ongoing debate over
tort reform. Typically, those in favor of tort reform tend to be physicians,
hospitals, and others connected with the health care industry. On the
other side of the debate, the most vocal advocates tend to be plaintiffs'
attorneys. Historically-though by no means exclusively-Republicans
have been greater allies in the push for tort reform than have Demo-
crats. o0 While the debate has been raging for over four decades, with
each side making numerous nuanced arguments, three general points of
contention dominate the discussion. This section engages with this ongo-
ing debate, discussing the evidence and arguments made in connection
with each point.
1. Medical Malpractice Litigation: Too Much or Too Little?
Beginning with the pro-tort-reform point of view, proponents argue
Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem,
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447 (2004).
"o Rogan Kersh, Medical Malpractice and the New Politics of Health Care, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYsTEM 43, 46-47 (William M. Sage & Rogan
Kersh eds., 2006); see id. at 48 (discussing a series of "first generation" and "second
generation" tort reforms).
2 See id. at 43-54.
o0 See MELLO & KAcHAUA, supra note 21, at 32-61.
1' Id. at 90; see also Mello et al., Medical Liability, supra note 21, at 1807.
'o See Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1209-11 (discussing Republicans'
historical propensity to support tort reforms and Democrats' propensity to oppose
them); see also Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 144; Paul H. Rubin, Public Choice and Tort
Reform, 124 PUB. CHOICE 223, 233 (2005).
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that too many medical malpractice claims are filed in the United States
and that a large percentage of these claims are frivolous. The American
Medical Association ("AMA") contends that "most liability claims are
without merit," and some empirical evidence supports this claim.1" For
example, analyzing data from 25 medical specialties, researchers con-
cluded that more than 75% of claims result in no payment to the com-
plainant'0 7 and projected that, "[bly the age of 65 years, 75% of physi-
cians in low-risk specialties and 99% of those in high-risk specialties
[would have] face [d] a claim." Examining another data source, other
researchers found that only 55% of claims against physicians resulted in
litigation and that 54% of those cases that were litigated were dis-
missed.( Based on this evidence, the AMA argues that- "most liability
claims are without merit" and further notes that, as a result of this high
volume of litigation, "physicians in certain states [can see] liability pre-
miums [that] can exceed $100,000 or even $200,000 per year."no
On the other side of the debate, those opposed to tort reform argue
that too few medical malpractice claims are filed in the United States. As
a threshold matter, opponents of tort reform emphasize that medical er-
rors do, in fact, occur. The National Academy of Medicine estimated in
1999 that 98,000 people die each year at a cost of $29 billion because of
medical errors."' A more recent study estimated that more than 250,000
people died as a result of medical errors in 2013, placing medical errors
just behind heart disease and cancer in terms of cause of death in the
United States.' Relatedly, one study estimated that 18% of hospital pa-
AM. MED. Ass'N, MEDICAL LIABILITYREFORM Now! 1 (2016).
107 Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty. 365 N.
ENG. J. MED. 629, 629 (2011) ("78% of all claims did not result in payments to
claimants."); see also JOSE R. GUARDADO, AM. MED. Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE INDEMNITY PAYMENTS, EXPENSES AND CLAIM DISPOSITION, 2006-2015,
at 3 (2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/public/
government/advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-claim.pdf
(noting that 68.2% of malpractice claims were dropped, dismissed, or withdrawn).
.o. Jena et al., supra note 107, at 633; see also CAROL IL KANE, AM. MED. ASS'N,
MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIM FREQUENCY: A 2007-2008 SNAPSHOT OF PHYSICIANS 2 (2010),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/public/health-
policy/prp-201001-claim-freq.pdf ("42.2 percent of physicians surveyed over the 2007
to 2008 field period had a medical liability claim filed against them at some point in
their career."); id. at 3 ("90 percent of general surgeons age 55 and older have been
sued.").
'm Anupam B. Jena et al., Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against US
Physicians, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 892, 893 (2012).
.o AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 106, at 1-2.
"' INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1-
2 (2000), https://doi.org/10.17226/9728. The National Academy of Medicine was
formerly known as the Institute of Medicine.
" Martin A. Makary & Daniel Michael, Medical Error-the Third Leading Cause of
Death in the US, 353 BRIT. MED.J. 2139 (2016). But see Aaron Carroll, Death by Medical
[Vol. 22:41218
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-tients suffer a.medical injury. Despite the pervasiveness of medical er-
rors, the American Association for Justice (AAJ) , which is among the
most vocal opponents of tort reform, points out that "very few injured pa-
tients ever file a medical negligence lawsuit.""5 Examining a sample of
malpractice claims from five different insurers, David Studdert and sev-
eral co-authors concluded that "portraits of a malpractice system that is
stricken with frivolous litigation are overblown" and "that the' malpractice
system performs reasonably well in its function of separating claims with-
out merit from those with merit and compensating the latter.""' Com-
menting on these findings, William Sage noted that "the major problem
out there is medical errors that are not compensated, rather than frivo-
lous claims that are compensated."' -
Given the competing claims made by each side with respect to
whether there is a glut or dearth of medical malpractice claims, it is no
surprise that they differ on the need for tort reforms to reduce the num-
ber of claims filed. In general, the evidence on the effectiveness of tort
reforms is somewhat mixed."" For example, Ronen Avraham found that
noneconomic damages caps decrease the number and size of payments
Error: Adding Context to Scary Headlines, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/08/16/upshot/death-by-medical-error-adding-context-to-some-
scary-numbers.html (questioning the methodology underlying these "sensationalistic"
estimates).
"' Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patent Harm
Resulting from Medical Care, 363 N. Eng. J. Med. 2124, 2127 (2010); see also Philip F.
Stahel et al., Wrong-Site and Wrong-Patient Procedures in the Universal Protocol Era, 145
ARCHIVES SURGERY 978, 978 (2010) (noting "a persisting high frequency of surgical
'never events,'"-which are mistakes that should "never" happen).
'" Formerly the American Trial Lawyers Association.
AM. Ass'N FOR JUSTICE, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE: TH4E ROLE OF AMERICA'S CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN PROTECTING PATIENT'S RIGHTS 8 (2011), https://wwwjustice.org/
medical-negligence-role-america%E2%80%99s-civil-justice-system-protecting-
patients%E2%80%99-rights.
"' David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEw ENG.J. MED. 2024, 2031 (2006).
"' Amanda Gardner, Frivolous Claims Make Up Small Share of Malpractice Suits,
HEALTH DAY (May 10, 2006), https://consumer.healthday.com/general-health-
information-16/doctor-news-206/frivolous-claims-make-up-small-share-of-malpractice-
suits-532622.html (quoting William M. Sage); see also Tom BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH 22 (Univ. Chi. Press 2005) (entitling a chapter "An Epidemic of
Medical Malpractice, Not Malpractice Lawsuits").
"' Compare Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on
Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments, 36 J.L. STUD. S183, S186-87 (2007)
[hereinafter Avraham, An Empirical Study] (finding noneconomic damages caps
reduce medical malpractice liability risk), withJohn J. Donohue III & Daniel E. Ho,
The Impact of Damage Caps on Malpractice Claims: Randomization Inference with Difference-
in-Diferences, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 69, 69 (2007) (finding noneconomic damages
caps do not reduce medical malpractice liability risk).
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made as part of malpractice disputes,''" and this reduction appears to de-
crease the malpractice premiums physicians must pay. On the other
hand, John Donohue and Daniel Ho "f[ou]nd no evidence that [none-
conomic damages] caps affect the number of malpractice claims against
physicians. After reviewing existing studies as part of a comprehensive
report for the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Michelle Mello
and Allen Kachalia concluded that noneconomic damages caps reduce
the frequency of claims made against physicians and the amount-of com-
pensation paid to complainants. Examining other traditional tort re-
forms, such as joint and several liability reform and collateral source rule
reform, they found little to no evidence that these reforms have an im-
pact on the malpractice risk faced by physicians.
The ability of noneconomic damages caps to decrease the size and
frequency of payments made to resolve malpractice claims is welcome
news to those who argue that the majority of malpractice claims are frivo-
lous. On the other hand, opponents of tort reform point out that, be-
cause most claims are not frivolous and because those that are frivolous
are effectively filtered out by the legal system, the reduction in claims
impairs the rights of victims. Some empirical evidence supports this con-
tention. For example, Andrew Friedson and Thomas Kniesner explain
that noneconomic damages caps "can best be thought of as a 25% tax on
the asset value of settlements.",2 4 This may be particularly problematic for
victims because, as noted by Joanna Shepherd, attorneys are reluctant to
take medical malpractice cases when the possible damages are below a
certain threshold-$250,000 is a relevant threshold for many attorneys.
"9 Avraham, An Empirical Study, supra note 118, at S186 ("[Noneconomic
damages caps] appear[] sometimes to decrease the number of positive payments and
at other times to decrease the magnitude of payments.").
'2 See Patricia Born et al., The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurers'
Ultimate Losses, 76 J. RISK & INS. 197, 197 (2009) (finding that noneconomic damages
caps reduce medical malpractice losses and increase the profitability of medical
malpractice insurers); see also W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, Damages Caps,
Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance, 72 J. RISK & INS. 23, 41
(2005) (finding that insurers pass some of the savings from lower malpractice liability
payments on to physicians).
Il2 Donohue & Ho, supra note 118, at 69; see also Katherine Baicker & Amitabh
Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10709, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w10709 ("[I]ncreases in malpractice payments made on behalf of physicians do not
seem to be the driving force behind increases in premiums.").
22 MELLO & KAcHALIA, supra note 21, at 39 ("The weight of the evidence suggests
that caps reduce claims frequency [and] achieve substantial savings in average claims
payments.").
12 Id. at 3-5.
124 Andrew I. Friedson & Thomas J. Kniesner, Losers and Losers: Some Demographics
of Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms, 45 J. RISK& UNCERTAINTY 115, 115 (2012).
'2 Joanna M. Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical
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If tort reform reduces damages, victims may find it more difficult to ob-
tain representation and, thus, compensation for their injuries. Overall,
both sides make compelling arguments with respect to the current level
of medical malpractice claims, and both sides can point to empirical evi-
dence supporting their claims.
2. Tort Liability and Access to Health Care
During the debate over the ACA, "access to health care" became
something of a refrain because it is one of the most important policy is-
sues in health care. While the ACA eschewed an attempt at federal tort
reform, reform at the state level may have important implications for
whether individuals can access the care they need. Pro-reform groups,
such as the AMA, argue that, as a result of the number of meritless mal-
practice claims and high malpractice insurance premiums, individuals'
access to health care is impaired because physicians choose not to prac-
tice in areas with high malpractice liability risk, do not provide care to
high-risk patients, and avoid certain procedures that may be medically
126
beneficial because the risk of liability is too high. Some evidence sup-
ports these claims. For example, Andrea Carpentieri and several co-
authors surveyed members of the American Congress of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists-generally considered a high-risk specialty2'-in 2015
and found that 40% of those surveyed had made changes to their prac-
tice in the last three years as a result of the affordability or availability of
malpractice insurance.1 2 8 Beyond changing how they practice, many phy-
sicians change where they practice as a result of liability costs. The AMA
explains that "[t]he research provides a convincing argument that physi-
cian supply is more plentiful and patients' access to care is enhanced in
areas where physicians are under less pressure from the liability sys-
tem. . .. "'
The AAJ counters that "[a]necdotal accounts of doctors fleeing
states in response to increased insurance premiums have proved to be
either unrepresentative isolated events, or flat out false."o3 0 For example,
one report from the federal government noted that claims of physicians
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 151 (2014).
126 See AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 106, at 2.
" Jena et al., supra note 107, at 632-33.
128 ANDREW M. CARPENTIERI ET AL., OVERVIEW OF THE 2015 ACOG SURVEY ON
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, (AM. CONGRESS OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS),
4 (Nov. 3, 2015), www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Professional-Liability/
2015PLSurveyNationalSummaryll3l5.pdf; see also Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians'
Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1585, 1587
(2010) (reporting that over 60% of physicians ordered tests to avoid the appearance
of malpractice).
'2' AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 106, at 3.
* AM. Ass'N FORJUSTICE, supra note 115, at 11.
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fleeing high-risk jurisdictions may have been over-stated.1 3 1 Pointing to
data from the AMA, the AAJ notes that the number of physicians has
"been increasing across the board for many years" and that states without
caps on noneconomic damages have more physicians per capita than
states that have enacted this reform.3 2
Examining different measures of access to health care, studies have
generally found that tort reforms increase access. 13 Beginning with the
most well-studied measure of access-physician supply-most studies
have found that tort reforms-particularly noneconomic damages caps-
increase the supply of physicians. As Mello and Kachalia note, "[a]mong
13 controlled studies, 10 have found significant increase in physician
supply in at least some models;" though- these observed increases are
generally small-usually between 2% and 5%-and concentrated among
high-risk specialists and physicians in rural areas.'3 4 Beyond physician
supply, other studies have examined more nuanced measures of access.
Eric Helland and Mark Showalter concluded that, when physicians face
less risk of liability, they increase the number of hours they supply care.
Using a measure of access that became quite popular during the ACA
debate-health insurance coverage-another study found that, when
physicians are protected by tort reforms, health insurance coverage in-
creases for groups who are price-sensitive.13 1 Overall, the evidence sug-
1.1 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 12-26 (2003), available at
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf. But see Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (Dec. 10,
2009), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/
12-10-medicalmalpractice.pdf (noting that, after the 2003 report mentioned above,
the Congressional Budget Office had re-evaluated its earlier stance on the effect of
medical malpractice liability risk on the health care system).
'1 AM. Ass'N FORJUSTICE, supra note 115, at 11. It is important to note that simply
looking at the mean number of physicians in states with and without noneconomic
damages caps provides very little information about whether caps actually increase
the number of physicians. See infra Part III.D (discussing the flaws in this
methodology).
"' See MELLO & KAcHALIA, supra note 21, at 32-61 (providing a thorough review
of this literature).
Id. at 36.
15 See, e.g., Benjamin J. McMichael, Beyond Physicians: The Effect of Licensing and
Liability Laws on the Supply of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 23-40
(Mercatus Center Working Paper, 2017), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/
mcmichael-scope-of-practice-mercatus-working-paper-v1.pdf (examining the effect of
tort reform on the supply of nurse practitioners and physician assistants).
'" Eric Helland & Mark H. Showalter, The Impact of Liability on the Physician Labor
Market, 52 J.L. & ECoN. 635, 637-38 (2009) ("[A] 10 percent increase in expected
liability costs . . . is associated with a 2.85 decrease in hours worked per week.").
" Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Refom on Private
Health Insurance Coverage, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 319, 336-48 (2010).
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gests that tort reforms can increase access to care, but the increase in ac-
cess is often small.3 8
3. Defensive Medicine, Deterrence, and the Cost of Health Care
The most hotly debated point with respect to medical malpractice
and tort reform is the prevalence of defensive medicine and the ability of
tort reforms to reduce its practice. In general, defensive medicine is "a
deviation from sound medical practice that is induced primarily by a
threat of liability." 39 For example, a physician may order an unnecessary
diagnostic test involving magnetic resonance imaging on a knee to rule
out torn ligaments when she knows-based on other examinations and
tests-that the knee is merely sprained in order to protect herself against
a malpractice claim in the future. While the practice of defensive medi-
cine obviously has implications for patients who are subject to unneces-
sary (and often painful) medical tests and procedures, defensive medi-
cine could also contribute to the high costs of the health care system, as
patients are charged for services which are, by definition, medically un-
necessary.
The existence and prevalence of defensive medicine have been ex-
tensively debated in both policy and academic arenas, but when asked,
most physicians respond that they practice defensively. While most
physicians are fully insured against the direct costs associated with mal-
practice claims, they nevertheless face incentives to avoid claims based on
uninsurable costs. David Dranove and several colleagues have explained
that these other costs include reputational harm, the stress of litigation,
and the time away from their practices that physicians must spend de-
fending a claim." Whether the incentives created by these costs cause
physicians to provide safe and effective care or encourage them to prac-
tice defensively remains an important point of contention.
The AMA argues that "our medical liability system causes health care
expenditures to be higher than they otherwise would be" because "the
fear of lawsuits affects the way in which physicians practice."' This ar-
gument finds some support in existing empirical research. For example,
Brandon Roberts and Irving Hoch found that, for every additional law-
suit per 100,000 county residents in Mississippi, Medicare spending in-
creased by nearly $2.50 per beneficiary, suggesting that up to 1.6% of
Medicare spending in Mississippi was due solely to the malpractice liabil-
" See generally MELLO & KAcHALIA, supra note 21, at 32-61.
.. Studdert et al., supra note 116, at 2609.
' Id. (noting that 93% of physicians in Pennsylvania reported that they
practiced defensive medicine).
141 David Dranove et al., Delivering Bad News: Market Responses to Negligence, 55 J.L.
& EcoN. 1, 1-8 (2012).
141 AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 106, at 5.
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ity climate." In another study, Katherine Baicker, Elliot Fisher, and
Amitabh Chandra determined that a 10% increase in the average pay-
ment to a complainant was associated with up to a 1.8% increase in the
use of diagnostic procedures.'" Estimates of the total cost of defensive
medicine across the entire health care system vary widely: some estimates
place it around $55 billion," 5 but applying other methods results in esti-
mates between $120 and $220 billion.1
The AAJ counters that defensive .medicine is not commonly prac-
ticed."'7 Citing government and academic research, the AAJ notes that
little conclusive evidence suggests the widespread practice of defensive
118
medicine. Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that malpractice
liability effectively encourages physicians and other providers to provide
safer and more effective care and that defensive medicine may actually
benefit patients. For example Praveen Dhankar, Mahmud Khan, and
Shalini Bagga found that "an increase in medical malpractice risk leads
to a reduction in resource use and improvement in health outcome for
patients with less severe medical conditions.""9 Similarly, Bernard Black,
Amy Wagner, and Zenon Zabinski found an association between mal-
practice payouts and patient safety indicators, suggesting that malprac-
tice liability may be tied to the provision of safe care in a systematic way. 1o
Beyond the potential for defensive medicine to positively affect pa-
tient outcomes, the AAJ explains that what has traditionally been under-
stood as defensive medicine may simply represent physicians' attempts to
"' Brandon Roberts & Irving Hock, Malpractice Litigation and Medical Costs in
Mississippi, 16 HEALTH EcoN. 841, 846 (2007). But seeJ. William Thomas et al., Low
Costs of Defensive Medicine, Small Savings from Tort Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1578, 1578
(2010) (noting that "the presumed impact of tort reform on health care costs may be
overstated.").
144 Katherine Baicker et al., Malpractice Liability Costs and the Practice of Medicine in
the Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841, 841-52 (2007).
145 Mello et al., National Costs, supra note 16, at 1575; see also Illingworth et al.,
supra note 23, at 263 (estimating $50 billion).
"' See AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 106, at 7 (describing the application of other
methods and arriving at a final estimate "in a range of $120.0 and $215.9 billion").
SAM. Ass'N FORJUSTICE, supra note 115, at 16-18.
" Id.; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2004); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 131, at 1-6;
Baicker & Chandra, supra note 121, at 24. It is important to note that, since the
government report relied upon by the AAJ in making its arguments was issued, new
conclusions have been drawn.
141 Praveen Dhankar et al., Effect of Medical Malpractice on Resource Use and
Mortality of AMI Patients, 4J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 163, 163 (2007). But see Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26 (questioning the methodology
of Dhankar et al.).
' Bernard S. Black et al., The Association Between Patient Safety Indicators and
Medical Malpractice Risk: Evidence from Florida and Texas, 3 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 109,
134-35 (2017).
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generate additional income by providing more services'5-sometimes re-
ferred to as the practice of "offensive medicine." The idea that physicians
practice offensively because the extra tests and procedures generate
more income, and not because physicians fear malpractice claims, finds
some support in existing research. Troyen Brennan, Michelle Mello, and
David Studdert explain that "[in medicine practiced as a business, de-
fensive medicine is understood and may even be profitable."
- .-While proponents and opponents continue to disagree on the over-
all prevalence of defensive medicine, a variety of empirical studies have
examined the ability of tort reform to effectively reduce its practice and
decrease costs for the health care system overall. In what may be the
seminal study on defensive medicine, Daniel Kessler and Mark McCellan
examined Medicare spending on patients suffering from ischemic heart
disease and heart attacks.'" They found that states with "direct"1 tort re-
forms had significantly lower Medicare spending for these cardiac pa-
tients. Despite this lower spending, Kessler and McClellan found no ev-
idence that cardiac patients in tort reform states were at any increased
risk of mortality or medical complications.'57
Later studies have investigated the effects of tort reform on other
measures of defensive medicine and have found similar results. For ex-
ample, Ronen Avraham and Max Schanzenbach conducted a study along
the same lines as Kessler and McClellan by examining heart attack pa-
tients.' They found that a noneconomic damages cap reduced the
probability that a patient received an intensive treatment by between
1.25% and 2%, indicating these caps reduce the pressure on physicians
to perform more intensive and invasive procedures. Similar to earlier
studies, Avraham and Schanzenbach also found "that tort reform is not
associated with an increase in mortality from coronary artery disease
[and that] if anything, mortality declines."'65 Beyond affecting treatment
... AM. Ass'N FORJUSTICE, supra note 115, at 17.
1 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Liability, Patient Safety, and Defensive Medicine: What
Does the Future Hold, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 93,
112 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006).
... See MELLO & KAcHALIA, supra note 21, at 32-61 (reviewing these studies in
great depth).
Kessler & McClellan, Do Doctors Practice, supra note 25, at 366-85.
"Direct" tort reforms include damages caps, bans on punitive damages, no
mandatory prejudgment interest, and collateral source rule reform. Id. at 371.
Id. at 353.
Id.; see also Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Malpractice Law and Health Care
Reform: Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care, 84 J. PUB. EcoN. 175, 175
(2002).
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decisions, tort reforms (particularly noneconomic damages caps) have
been shown to reduce the rate at which physicians refer patients to spe-
cialists,'or the overall number of surgeries,6 2 the rate of episiotomies, 3
the number of hospital admissions,"" and the number of hospital inpa-
tient days.
However, not every study has found evidence that tort reforms re-
duce the practice of defensive medicine. For example, Frank Sloan and
John Shadle concluded that tort reforms do not effectively limit Medi-
care spending, su esting that they do not ameliorate the practice of de-
fensive medicine. Myungho Paik and several co-authors "f[oulnd no
evidence that Texas's tort reforms bent the cost curve downward."" Paik
and several-of the same -co-authors conducted a- later study of Medicare
spending and "f[oulnd that damage caps have no significant impact on
Medicare Part A spending, but predict roughly 4% higher Medicare Part
B spending."'6 Relatedly, and consistent with the AAJ's arguments con-
cerning offensive medicine, Janet Currie and Bentley MacLeod found
that noneconomic damages caps increase the use of unnecessary C-
sections and the chances of experiencing complications during labor and
delivery.1 6 9
As with the effect of tort reform on access to health care, the effect
of reform on defensive medicine and associated costs is mixed. Reviewing
the evidence available at the time, the Congressional Budget Office
"concluded that the weight of empirical evidence now demonstrates a
link between tort reform and the use of health care services" and pro-
jected that enacting a package of five tort reforms "would reduce nation-
"' Xiao Xu et al., The Effect of Medical Malpractice Liability on Rate of Referrals
Received by Specialist Physicians, 8 HEALTH EcoN., POLICY & L. 453, 465-75 (2013).
1 Anca M. Cotet, The Impact of Noneconomic Damages Cap on Health Care Delivery in
Hospitals, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 192, 192 (2012).
'r' Michael Frakes, Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Oractices, 9 J. EMPIRIcAL L. STUD.
457, 459 (2012) [hereinafter Frakes, Defensive Medicine].
" Cotet, supra note 162, at 192.
Frakes, Defensive Medicine, supra note 163, at 459.
1' Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for "Defensive
Medicine"? A Reassessment, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 481, 481-91 (2009). But see Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26 (noting that "Sloan and
Shaddle had significantly smaller sample sizes" in comparison to earlier studies and
that this could explain the absence of an effect of tort reform).
17 Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost Curve? Evidence from Texas, 9
J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 173, 173 (2012).
"" Myungho Paik et al., Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine, Revisited,
Northwestern L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-20, at 1, 2 (2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2110656.
' Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth
Outcomes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 820 (2008).
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al health spending . .. by roughly 0.5 percent."'7 0 Similarly, in their re-
cent review of the existing evidence, Mello and Kachalia concluded that
"[a] reasonable conclusion to draw from [the existing] studies is that
noneconomic damages caps have been shown to be associated with re-
ductions in some, albeit not all, indicators of defensive medicine.""'
While extensive evidence concerning the effect of traditional tort re-
forms on defensive medicine has been developed, very little evidence
concerning apology laws exist."' This Article begins to fill the large gap
in both the tort reform and apologies literatures by specifically examin-
ing the effect of apology laws on the practice of defensive medicine.
However, before conducting an empirical analysis of apology laws, it is
important to understand how they function as tort reforms, and the re-
mainder of this section situates apology laws firmly in the tort reform
context.
B. Apology Laws as Tort Reforms: Theory, Practice, and Evidence
Though apology laws are formally changes to state rules of evidence,
two important aspects of these laws clearly delineate them as tort re-
forms. First, states justify the enactment of these laws based on their abil-
ity to reduce the number of malpractice claims that are filed and facili-
tate the settlement of those that are filed.'73 States do not generally
appeal to the ability of apologies to promote reparative discourse, en-
courage reconciliation- among wrongdoers and victims, or facilitate the
healing process within communities.1 7 4 States' narrow focus on apology
laws as a means to alter the litigation landscape echoes their historical
approach to tort reform, which has been centered on the goal of curtail-
ing litigation-related risks. Second, many states have limited the applica-
bility of apology laws to medical malpractice.7 5 This strategy of limiting
apology laws to medical malpractice is similar to the approach some
states have used with more familiar tort reforms, demonstrating that
17o Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 131, at 4.
171 MELLO & KAciAI, supra note 21, at 36. Mello and Kachalia review the
evidence concerning the effects of other tort reforms as well, but this evidence is
generally not as extensive as that concerning noneconomic damages caps. See id. at
32-61.
171 Id. at 92 ("The available evidence is too limited to draw a conclusion about
[the general effects of apology laws]; a reasonable summary at this point is that the
liability-reducing effects of apology laws have not yet been demonstrated.").
17 See Boothman et al., supra note 66, at 131.
"7 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 142.
"' See id. at 144 n.4 ("California, Massachusetts, Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and
Washington have general apology statutes that apply across all industries while the
other 30 States have specific laws that only protect the statements of apology made by
health care providers."); see also, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (limiting the
protection of apology laws to health care providers).
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apology laws, in practice, function as tort reforms.'16 Beyond these two
aspects of apology laws themselves, Arbel and Kaplan carefully traced the
political development of these laws, highlighting how proponents of tort
reform adopted apology laws as a new means to accomplish the goals of
177tort reform.
While states' approaches to apology laws echo their approaches to
tort reform more generally, they do not evaluate apology laws as such.
For example, though many states have limited apology laws to medical
malpractice, they have ignored the effect of these laws on the health care
system.7 8 In contrast, the ability of noneconomic damages caps and other
tort reforms to impact health care is one of the most important points of
contention -among those- who support and oppose these - reforms.
Moreover, despite the importance of apology laws as a new generation of
tort reform and despite the theoretical and empirical attention apologies
have received in the legal, economic, and psychological literatures, apolo-
gy laws as tort reforms remain understudied.'o To date, only three rigor-
ous empirical studies have examined apology laws, and these studies have
been limited to the litigation context, i.e., the first point of contention
above. This dearth of evidence is problematic because apology laws are
sufficiently different from traditional tort reforms that conclusions about
the effects of the former cannot be extrapolated from the effects of the
latter. As Mello and Kachalia note, "although there are good theoretical
reasons to believe the number and average payment per paid claim may
drop in the presence of apology laws, there are also theoretical reasons
that claim frequency may increase."',8 The same theoretical reasons that
predict conflicting effects of apology laws on paid claims also predict
conflicting effects of these laws on the practice of defensive medicine.
More specifically, apology laws differ from traditional tort reforms in
two key respects. First, apology laws require action on the part of the de-
fendant at (or near) the time of the injury in order to affect malpractice
liability risk, i.e., the defendant must apologize. Second, assuming an
apology is delivered consistent with the law's intent, the apology itself
must assuage the patient's anger and not, in some way, encourage the pa-
tient to pursue a claim. Based on these two features of apology laws, their
effect on medical malpractice liability risk and defensive medicine is not
as straightforward as other reforms. For example, the effect of noneco-
nomic damages caps on medical malpractice claims is uncomplicated:
171 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. tit. 34 § 18-14-3 (imposing a limit on damages in
medical malpractice actions only).
177 See Arbel & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 1212 ("Tort reformers borrowed from
Legal Apologists both the means and the rhetoric to advance their goals.").
178 MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 21, at 1.
I7 Id. at 33.
'8 Id. at 61; Mello et al., supra note 21, at 1807.
1 Id.
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(1) caps decrease the size of payments because they impose a strict cutoff
on one part of any malpractice award, and (2) caps decrease the number
of claims asserted because some patients will decide not to file a claim
against their physicians based on the smaller payment they can expect.
Physicians, recognizing the decreased risk of being held liable for mal-
practice, decrease their practice of defensive medicine in the presence of
183
noneconomic damages caps. Apology laws may have a similar effect on
malpractice claims and the practice of defensive medicine, but as ex-
plained by Ho and Liu, these laws may have very different effects based
on what assumptions one makes about the underlying episode of health
care.184 In general, three theories explain how apology laws may work to
affect medical malpractice litigation.
First, apology laws may work exactly as intended. As detailed above,
apologies from physicians to patients can assuage anger, soothe aggres-
sion, and thereby decrease physicians' liability risk. States passed apology
laws to encourage exactly this type of behavior by physicians and gener-
ate exactly these types of benefits. Ho and Liu explain that an apology
"law eliminates the primary cost the doctor faces from an apology," i.e.,
the possibility that an apology may be used as evidence in a subsequent
trial, and that "[t]hus in a symmetric information world, the law has ex-
actly its intended effects."'15 By "symmetric information world," Ho and
Liu mean that when a physician commits malpractice, both the physician
and the patient have the same information and are fully aware that mal-
practice has occurred. Ho and Liu theorize that, when this is the case,
apology laws work exactly as states intend them to by reducing the fre-
quency and size of malpractice payments.'
Next, apology laws may have the opposite of their intended effect.
Ho and Liu contrast the symmetric information world with the asymmet-
ric information world in which one party possesses private information to
which the other party is not privy." In this context, the physician has pri-
vate information about whether malpractice occurred. Though it may
seem counterintuitive, "[m] ost patients never learn they are victims of a
medical error" because of the complexity of medical care and the inabil-
ity of many patients to comprehend the intricacies of their care.'8 Ho
... See Avraham, supra note 118, at S188-94.
183 id.
184 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 163.
18 Id. at 150.
186 Id.
187 Id.
18 Sandra G. Boodman, Should Hospitals-and Doctors-Apologize for Medical
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and Liu explain that, in an asymmetric information world, the theoreti-
cal effects of apology laws become unclear;8 9 however, they note that
apology laws could have the perverse effects of increasing the size and
frequency of malpractice claims.'" When patients do not know whether
their injuries stem from malpractice or are a natural result of their illness
or course of treatment, apologies from physicians could signal the occur-
rence of malpractice to patients who otherwise would not have discov-
ered that malpractice.19' Even if patients cannot use the apology itself as-
evidence of malpractice, apologies by physicians can encourage patients
to seek other admissible evidence and turn to the legal system for re-
dress, thereby increasing the frequency and size of malpractice payments.
Finally, apology -laws may simply have no effect.'92 As noted above,
apologies are not equivalent to apology laws, despite the fact that discus-
sions of the latter tend to center on promoting the benefits of the for-
mer. If apology laws do not encourage apologies, then, regardless of
whether the physician-patient relationship is characterized by symmetric
or asymmetric information, apology laws will have no effect because
nothing will have changed in that relationship.
Among the three theories of apology laws, empirical research has
found support for the first two. Ho and Liu conducted two separate stud-
ies of apology laws. In both studies, they analyzed data on malpractice
claim payouts contained in the National Practitioner Databank, which
includes information on most of the positive payments made to resolve
malpractice disputes since the 1990s.'9 3 Throughout their analyses, they
did not differentiate between full and partial apology laws but amalga-
mated them into a single category.
In their first study, Ho and Liu examined the number of malpractice
cases and the total payments made to resolve these cases at the state lev-
el.'95 They found that apology laws increase the frequency of malpractice
claims by about 15%'9 and that these laws increase claim payouts by
' Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 150 ("Unfortunately, private information also
makes the model's predictions indeterminate.").
'" Id.
" Similarly, if a patient suspects malpractice has occurred but is not sure, an
apology could confirm the malpractice and embolden her to file a claim.
1' Ho and Liu do not explicitly consider this possibility, and they assume that
apology laws encourage physicians to apologize more often. Id. at 142 ("Although we
do not observe actual apologies, the maintained assumption of this paper is that by
reducing the consequences of apologies, doctors would apologize more frequently.").
'9 Ho & Liu, supra note 7, at 185.
194 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 146.
1 Id. at 154.
9 Id. at 156 ("The results show a consistent 14-15% increase in closed claim
frequency with positive payouts.").
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-about 25%." However, based on an analysis of four states that enacted
apology laws relatively early, Ho and Liu concluded that, in the long run,
the net effect of apology laws on claim frequency is zero or possibly nega-
tive, which is generally consistent with their intended effect. 9 Along the
same lines, the researchers disaggregated malpractice claims by the sever-
ity of the injury involved and concluded, based on further analysis, that
"after passing the law, there is a short-term increase in the number of
cases that normally take many years to resolve, but an overall decrease in
the number of cases involving the least significant injuries."'" These re-
sults are broadly consistent with the goals of apology laws.
After conducting their state-level analysis, Ho and Liu analyzed indi-
vidual malpractice claims and found that, following the passage of an
200apology law, claims involving severe injuries resolved more quickly.
Next, analyzing claims with different injury severities separately, the re-
- searchers concluded that claim payouts for the least severe injuries in-
creased slightly but that the payments made to resolve claims involving
the most severe injuries decreased substantially.20 Summarizing the find-
ings from their analysis of individual malpractice claims, Ho and Liu ex-
plained that their results "suggest that apology laws are consistent with
the symmetric information model . . . as well as the legislators' intent.,
2 02
In a separate study, the same researchers further examined the im-
pact of apology laws on claim payouts across different medical settings.203
Beginning with claim payouts across all settings, Ho and Liu found pay-
outs are $32,342 lower in states with apology laws;204 however, the size of
the payout reductions varied across injury types. For example, following
the passage of an apology law, payouts for claims involving anesthesia-
related injuries and those involving obstetrics injuries decreased by
$45,000 and $125,000, respectively.205 Similarly, Ho and Liu found that
the effect of apology laws varied by the specific type of malpractice act.
1 Id. ("The results for the total compensation payout also show an increase of
20-27%.").
198 Id. at 157 ("[A]pology laws' net effect [on the frequency of malpractice
payments] is zero (or possibly negative) in the long run.").
. Id. at 159.
2w Id. ("For a case involving a major/permanent injury, conditional on
resolution, the probability it resolves in any given year is increased by 19% when the
apology law is in effect.").
211 Id. at 162 ("[A]fter the law is adopted, claim payout would be reduced by
approximately $17,000-$27,000 for somewhat severe cases and $55,000-$73,000 for
the most severe cases.").
M2 Id. ("[T]he apology laws' combined effect is to increase apologies and
decrease expected settlement time, and should in the long term speed up settlements
and reduce the total number and value of malpractice payments.").
2' Ho & Liu, supra note 7, at 179.
23 Id. at 188.
2 Id. at 190.
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Malpractice claims involving "failure to diagnose" and "improper man-
agement" saw a larger decrease in average payout than claims involving
206
other types of allegations as a result of the passage of an apology law.
The study also revealed differences in the effect of apology laws on claim
207 208 209
payouts across provider type, patient age, and patient gender.
While the second study conducted by Ho and Liu did not emphasize
the conflicting theories concerning the effect of apology laws, I, along
with co-authors Lawrence Van Horn and Kip Viscusi, returned to these
conflicting theories in a recent study.210 Unlike prior work, we used a da-
taset obtained directly from a national malpractice insurer which con-
tained information on all malpractice claims asserted against 90% of the
physicians practicing in a single specialty.2" This dataset provided a more
complete picture of the malpractice landscape because claims that in-
volved no payout-which represent more than 50% of all claims assert-
ed-were included in the dataset.212 Focusing on partial apology laws, our
work examined different aspects of malpractice risk.
In doing so, we explicitly tested for different effects of apology laws
based on whether the information structure between the physician and
patient was symmetric or asymmetric by examining the different infor-
mation structures present when a physician is a surgeon (symmetric) or a
non-surgeon (asymmetric).21 In general, we found very little evidence
that apology laws affect the medical malpractice risk for surgeons one
way or the other.21" On the other hand, for non-surgeons, we found evi-
dence of a perverse effect of apology laws, consistent with the asymmetric
information world. No evidence suggested that apology laws reduce the
probability that a non-surgeon physician faces any malpractice claim.
However, we found that the mix of claims faced by non-surgeons changes
following the passage of an apology law, with the probability of claims
that do not involve lawsuits decreasing and the probability of lawsuits in-
206 Id.
20 id.
2 Id. at 192.
2' Id. at 194.
210 McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 13-17.
211 Id. at 5.
212 Id. at 11.
211 Id. at 22 ("Asymmetric information is more likely to be present in malpractice
claims involving non-surgeons than those involving surgeons. Surgeons generally
interact with and treat patients in a discrete event, i.e., the surgery they are
performing plus any pre-operative and post-operative care. Because of this discrete
interaction, patients who suffer an injury will likely have little trouble tracing that
injury to an error that occurred during surgery. On the other hand, non-surgeons
generally treat their patients over the course of years or may interact with patients a
number of times when attempting to resolve an injury or illness. Thus, observing the
malpractice of non-surgeon physicians may be more difficult.").
2.4 Id. at 28.
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21creasing.2' In other words, apology laws push people into the courtroom.
We also found that, for non-surgeons, apology laws substantially increase
the size of the payments made to resolve claims.21' All of these results are
consistent with the predictions of the asymmetric information world and
211
suggest that apology laws have perverse effects for non-surgeons.
Overall, the evidence on the effect of apology laws on medical mal-
practice litigation is mixed. Importantly, however, the evidence on apol-
ogy laws generally is both limited and narrowly focused. Compared with
other tort reforms, which have been subjected to over 100 separate anal-
218"
yses, apology laws have been largely ignored. To the extent that they
have not been ignored, the rigorous empirical work conducted so far has
focused on apology laws only in the context of their ability to affect med-
ical malpractice claims. Their effect on the health care system more gen-
erally has never been empirically evaluated. This Article begins to reme-
dy this problem.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF APOLOGY LAWS AS TORT REFORMS
This Section provides the first empirical analysis of apology laws be-
yond the narrow context of litigation, focusing specifically on the effects
of these laws on the practice of defensive medicine. Examining the prac-
tice of defensive medicine necessarily involves examining clinical out-
comes, and this study is the first to analyze the impact of apology laws on
such outcomes. In developing evidence on apology laws and defensive
medicine, I focus on the care received by heart attack patients, examin-
ing the treatments these patients receive, the resources used to treat
these patients, and the quality of care provided. I limit my analysis to
cardiac care for two reasons. First, as discussed in detail below, the cardi-
ac care considered here is particularly well suited to examining the role
of apology laws. Second, because prior work has previously examined the
effect of noneconomic damages caps on the cardiac care I examine here,
it is possible to make detailed comparisons between the effects of apology
laws and noneconomic damages caps. In general, I follow a similar em-
pirical strategy as Avraham and Schanzenbach but concentrate on apolo-
gy laws instead of noneconomic damages caps.220 By directly comparing
apology laws to what is generally regarded as the most effective tort re-
form-noneconomic damages caps-it is possible to firmly situate apolo-
25 Id. at 18-23.
216 Id. at 23-25.
211 Id. at 25-27.
21 See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 21, at 32-61.
211 In particular, the analysis here is similar to that conducted by Ronen Avraham
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gy laws in the tort reform landscape. Beyond clarifying the role of apolo-
gy laws as tort reforms, the results presented here provide new evidence
on and critical insight into how these laws affect the largest single sector
in the American economy-health care.
A. Medical Context
Throughout my empirical analysis, I consider cardiac patients who
221
have suffered an acute myocardial infarction ("AMI" or heart attack) .
The care received by these patients is uniquely well suited to an empirical
investigation into the role of apology laws in attenuating defensive medi-
222
cine for several reasons. First, heart surgeons and cardiologists face
223
significant liability pressure, meaning that liability reforms, including
apology laws, should have a more salient effect on these physicians than
other types of physicians. Second, heart disease is the leading cause of
224
death in the United States, making care provided to patients suffering
from heart attacks the best place to start when examining the role of
apology laws. Third, AMI patients are almost always admitted to a hospi-
tal for non-elective procedures. This allows for a detailed analysis of these
patients using only data on hospital patients.225 The non-elective nature
of the procedures used to treat AMIs also means that patients and physi-
cians have very little ability to schedule procedures far into the future,
which limits the number of factors that can confound the analysis of
apology laws. Fourth, and most importantly, the treatment choices for
AMI patients allow for some discretion on the part of the treating physi-
cian. The presence of "gray areas" in which physicians could legitimately
choose either the more intensive or less intensive treatment option
means that it is possible to observe some marginal changes in physician
treatment choices in response to the passage of an apology law.
In general, physicians have three options when treating AMI pa-
tients. First, the least intensive option is medical management, which in-
volves no surgical intervention. Second, at the intermediate level of in-
tensity is percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), which
is a minimally invasive procedure where a physician inserts a catheter in-
221 H. Michael Bolooki & Arman Askari, Acute Myocardial Infarction, CLEVELAND
CLINIC CTR. FOR CONTINUING EDUC. (Aug. 2010), https://teachmemedicine.org/
cleveland-clinic-acute-myocardial-infarction/.




22' Additionally, as noted by Avraham and Schanzenbach, using an inpatient
dataset for AMI patients avoids problematic selection issues. Id.
22' See Bolooki & Askari, supra note 221 (discussing medical management).
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to the patient's heart to address arterial blockages.22 Third, the most in-
tensive treatment option for AMIs is coronary artery bypass grafting
(CABG), which is a type of open heart surgery colloquially referred to as
228heart bypass surgery.
Collectively, these three treatment options create several gray areas
where physicians may choose either a more intensive or less intensive
procedure. Some patients will be candidates for both medical manage-
229
ment and a more intensive intervention. If a physician is practicing de-
fensively, she may be more willing to "put her thumb on the scale" in fa-
vor of a more intensive treatment instead of medically managing a
patient's condition. Thus, a shift away from more intensive treatments to
less intensive treatments following the passage of a tort reform is evi-
dence that the reform reduces the practice of defensive medicine. An-
other gray area exists for some patients who require more intensive
treatment, as physicians may have discretion to perform either PTCA or
CABG.no When only one or two arteries are blocked, physicians often
have discretion to choose between these two treatment options-
physicians lack this discretion and almost always choose CABG when
231
three or more are blocked. CABG is typically more profitable than
PTCA, but, because it is more invasive, it may expose health care provid-
ers to greater liability risk than PTCA. Thus, physicians may be more will-
ing to perform the more intensive CABG when they have discretion to do
so following the passage of tort reform because of a decrease in liability
risk.23 2
In addition to the procedure chosen to treat a particular AMI pa-
m Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26. (discussing
PTCA in relation to medical management and CABG. PTCA is also referred to as
Percutaneous Coronary Intervention.). See Bolooki & Askari, supra note 221.
22' Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
m Id. (noting PTCA is almost always chosen before CABG. They further explain
that PTCA and CABG are almost never performed together, meaning medical
management, PTCA, and CABG are, essentially, mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive categories of treatment. I am able to confirm this through my own
independent analysis of the data described below.).
230 id.
2" Id. ("PTCA is a substitute only for CABG when there is a blockage on one or
two arteries. If the blockage is on three or four arteries, the prevailing standard is to
perform CABG.").
" As Avraham and Schanzenbach explain, physicians may be more willing to
perform the more intensive CABG when they have discretion to do so following the
passage of tort reform for two reasons. First, consistent with the practice of defensive
medicine, physicians may be more willing to perform CABG when protected by tort
reform because they are less exposed to liability. Second, consistent with the practice
of offensive medicine, physicians may choose to perform CABG over PTCA because
the former is more profitable and, with the passage of tort reform, less risky in terms
of liability.
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tient, I also examine the costs associated with a particular hospital admis-
sion and the length of stay in the hospital. Even within the gray areas out-
lined above, physicians' ability to substitute between procedures may be
limited. Because costs and length of stay can vary much more easily-it is
easy to order extra tests or require a patient to stay a little longer-than
treatment choices, these variables may provide more information on the
role of apology laws in the practice of defensive medicine. Additionally,
much of the evidence concerning defensive medicine comes from
changes in ancillary services like medical imaging and in costs associated
with treatment. Accordingly, I investigate the effect of apology laws on
the costs of treating AMI patients. I supplement the cost analysis with a
length-of-stay analysis. because-cost data in the NIS-are -only-estimates of
true cost based on hospital charges, which can vary widely and may be
234
only weakly correlated with true costs. This means that length of stay
may actually capture the resources used to treat a given patient more ac-
curately. Length of stay is commonly used in the health services research
literature as a proxy for resource use,3 ' and, unlike cost, length of stay is
stable across hospitals.
Finally, I examine the mortality of AMI patients to measure the ef-
fect of apology laws on the quality of care delivered by physicians when
236
treating these patients. While other quality measures are available,
quality measurement-despite its prominence in the health care de-
bate-is still in its infancy, is subject to manipulation by those who are
incentivized to "improve" quality, and may fail to capture true quality.
Because of the problems with existing quality metrics, I examine mortali-
ty rates because death is well measured and is nearly universally consid-
231
ered an undesirable outcome following treatment for an AMI. Moreo-
ver, given the status of heart disease as the leading cause of death in the
United States, AMI death rates are important beyond their ability to
239
proxy for the quality of care.
See supra Part II.A.3.
234 See Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
215 See, e.g., Edward F. Philbin et al., Length of Stay and Procedure Utilization Are the
Major Determinants of Hospital Charges for Heart Failure, 24 CLINIcAL CARDIOLOGY 56, 56-
62 (2000).
M For an overview of the quality of care indicators developed by AHRQ, see
Introduction, AHRQ https://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/ (last visited October 26,
2018).
211 In one egregious example, hospitals began "throwing away less-than-perfect
organs and denying the sickest people lifesaving transplants" in order to satisfy newly
implemented federal quality standards. Casey Ross, Hospitals Are Throwing Out Organs
and Denying Transplants to Meet Federal Standards, THE RUNDOWN: HEALTH (Aug. 13,
2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/hospitals-throwing-organs-denying-
transplants-meet-federal-standards.
23 Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
259 See id. (examining mortality rates); Kessler & McClellan, supra note 25, at 376
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B. Data
To conduct an empirical analysis of the effect of apology laws on the
practice of defensive medicine (and, as a corollary, offensive medicine), I
use a dataset that contains information on all of the health care out-
comes described above. Specifically, I use data from the National Inpa-
tient Sample ("NIS"), which is part of a family of health care databases
developed by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) . The
NIS is the largest all-payer dataset for inpatient care in the United States
241and contains a 20% random sample of hospitals in the United States.
Each year, approximately 1,000 hospitals are sampled and between five
212and eight million hospital stays are included in the database. If a hospi-
tal is chosen for inclusion in the NIS, all inpatient records for the rele-
vant year are included in the dataset.243 In my analysis, I examine hospital
stays that occurred between 1999 and 2011.244
Using diagnosis codes available in the NIS, I isolate all patients who
245
suffered an AMI. Because over 90% of AMI patients are admitted to the
hospital, using the NIS to isolate AMI patients captures a large number
of people who suffered an AMI during the sample time frame. In fact,
approximately one out of every four heart attacks each year appears in
216
the dataset I analyze here. In addition to diagnosis codes, the NIS in-
cludes procedure codes which allow me to classify individuals as receiving
medical management, PTCA, or CABG.2 4 ' Beyond the diagnosis and
treatment for each AMI patient, the NIS contains information on costs,m
(same).
24 The NIS is not available for public download. The data use agreement that
allows the data to be used for this article is on file with HCUP and Vanderbilt
University.
24' Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
242 Id.
24 Id.; AGENCY FOR HEALTHcARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
HCUP NATIONAL INPATIENT SAMPLE (NIS) (2016), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/db/
nation/nis/NISIntroduction_2014.jsp#introduction.
244 Beginning in 2012, the NIS no longer includes information on the location of
hospitals, so it becomes impossible to determine whether the physicians at a given
hospital are governed by an apology law. In 1999, 22 states participated in the NIS,
and by 2011, 47 states had participated at least one year. See Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26 (reporting state participation
in the NIS).
245 More specifically, I restrict my dataset using the same procedure as id.
2 Id. ("We estimate that we observe roughly 25% of all heart attacks that
occurred in the sample timeframe in the states included in the NIS.").
211 It is also possible to separate those receiving CABG into CABG on one or two
arteries and CABG on three or four arteries.
' Information on the actual cost to treat a given patient is not available.
Similarly, information on what the patient paid as a result of her stay is not available.
However, the NIS includes charges associated with a given hospital stay, and an
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length of stay, and mortality.
Beyond these outcome variables, I use data in the NIS to construct a
series of control variables. The NIS includes patient age and sex at the
time of hospital admission. Each patient may also have up to 15 diagno-
ses entered into her record. From these additional diagnoses, I am able
to construct the constituent parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index,
which I use to control for a variety of comorbidities that may influence
treatment choice and other outcomes of interest. The NIS also in-,
cludes the source of payment for each patient's hospital stay, such as
250
Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance. Controlling for the source
of payment is important because physicians may face different incentives
with respect to- treatment choice and length of stay depending on the
source of payment.251 Additionally, as Avraham and Schanzenbach note,
the impetus behind the practice of offensive medicine is the desire to
perform more profitable procedures, and this impetus will be stronger
for patients with "better" sources of payment (e.g., private insurance
generally pays more for a given procedure than Medicare or Medi-
caid) .2 Additionally, the NIS includes data on the hospital where a given
patient is treated.253 The type of hospital may influence what treatments
patients receive. Relevant to the analysis here, the NIS includes infor-
mation on whether the hospital is a teaching hospital;25 whether the
hospital is large, medium, or small; whether the hospital is public or pri-
vate; whether the hospital is for-profit or not-for-profit; and whether the
accompanying dataset (available through HCUP) can be used to translate these
hospital charges into a coarse measure of costs. Unfortunately, both the information
and cost data derived from these are "notoriously noisy." Id.
1 See Bing Li et al., Risk Adjustment Performance of Charlson and Elixhauser
Comorbidities in ICD-9 and ICD-10 Administrative Databases, 8 BMC HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH 12-13 (2008) ("As major determinants of patient outcomes, comorbidities
or coexisting conditions have been studied extensively for decades."); Id. (noting that
the Charlson comorbidity index is a "commonly used instrument[] for risk
adjustment analyses.").
250 NIS Overview, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT, https://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/nisoverviewjsp#about (last updated Aug. 13, 2018).
2' See, e.g., Diane Alexander & Janet Currie, Are Publicly Insured Children Less
Likely to be Admitted to Hospital than the Privately Insured (and Does It Matter?), NAT'L
BUREAU OF EcoN. RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER No. 22542, Aug. 2016, at 21
("[H]ospitals are less likely to admit publicly insured children than privately insured
children . . . .
252 Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
2 1NS Description of Data Elements, AHRQ (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/db/nation/nis/nisddejsp.
254 See Laura G. Burke et al., Association Between Teaching Status and Mortality in US
Hospitals, 317J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2105, 2105 (2017) ("[M]ajor teaching hospital status
was associated with lower mortality rates for common conditions compared with
nonteaching hospitals.").
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255
hospital is in a rural area.
Finally, I supplement the information contained in the NIS with in-
formation from Ronen Avraham's Database of State Tort Law Reforms
(5 h ) .25" Based on this database, I code states as having enacted a noneco-
nomic damages cap or not. I also create an index of other reforms, con-
sistent with prior work, that includes the following: periodic payment re-
form, joint and several liability reform, punitive damages caps, and
collateral source rule reform.5 By including controls for these reforms, I
am able to isolate the effect of apology laws.
Table A2 in the Technical Appendix provides an overview of the da-
ta used in my empirical analysis. Each year, I observe between 109,000
2-18
and 144,000 AMI patients treated at hospitals across the country. At the
beginning of the data period in 1999, only about 3% of all AMI patients
received care in a state that had a partial apology law; however, by the
end of the period in 2011, over 70% of patients received care in a state
that had enacted a partial apology law. Similarly, full apology law cover-
age increases from zero in 1999 to over 10% in 2011. In general, more
men than women suffer AMIs, and the average age of those treated hov-
ers just under 70. Across the years examined here, the percentage of pa-
tients receiving PTCA increases substantially from just under 25% to over
45%. However, the percentage receiving CABG decreases slightly from
about 10% to about 8%. Similarly, length of stay decreases by nearly a
full day from 5.5 days to 4.7. Costs, however, increase by about $6,000 be-
tween 2001 and 2011.2s
C. Hypotheses
The three theories concerning the effect of apology laws on medical
malpractice claims discussed above can be directly extended to generate
three competing hypotheses concerning the effect of apology laws on the
2 For an overview of the differences across hospital types, see PAULJ. FELDSTEIN,
HEALTH POLICY IssuEs 225 (6th ed. 2015).
m Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (5th), Univ. of Texas Law
and Econ Research Paper No. e555 (2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=90271 1.
1 Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
2 Compared to the data examined by Avraham and Schanzenbach, the data
analyzed here include more individual observations each year. See id. However, the
summary statistics reported in Table A2 are remarkably similar to the statistics for the
dataset analyzed by Avraham and Schanzenbach, easing concerns that different
definitions of the underlying sample are causing any problems in comparing the
results for apology laws generated here with the results for noneconomic damages
caps generated there.
2 Cost data is not included in the NIS before 2001. Here, and throughout my
analysis, costs are reported in 2011 dollars to adjust for inflation.
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practice of defensive medicine,2," which I refer to as the intended effects
hypothesis, the perverse effects hypothesis, and the no effect hypothesis.
For convenience, the predictions associated with each hypothesis are
summarized in Table A3 in the Technical Appendix.
Beginning with the intended effects hypothesis, apology laws can fa-
cilitate and encourage apologies from physicians to patients and thereby
decrease the frequency and size of medical malpractice claims. Physi-
cians, anticipating a successful apology in the event of a medical error,-
should be under less pressure to practice defensively and should, there-
fore, be more willing to choose less intensive treatments if apology laws
have their intended effects. In other words, physicians should be more
willing to choose medical management over PTCA or CABG for patients
who could benefit from medical management. Along the same lines, if
apology laws have their intended effect, physicians may be more willing
to perform CABG over PTCA for patients who are candidates for both. As
Avraham and Schanzenbach note, CABG may involve more liability risk
than PTCA, meaning physicians may choose not to perform CABG in or-
der to avoid this risk. Thus, if apology laws work as intended, the prob
ability of receiving CABG should increase. In general, if apology laws
work as intended, then they should have similar effects on the outcomes
associated with AMI patients as noneconomic damages caps, including
decreasing costs and mortality rates. The results presented by Ho and Liu
generally indicate that apology laws can have their intended effect and,2
therefore, suggest that these laws should have a similar effect on the
treatment of AMI patients as do noneconomic damages caps.
Next, with respect to the perverse effects hypothesis, apology laws
may have exactly the opposite of their intended effects. As discussed
above, theory predicts that apology laws will have their intended effects if
patients and physicians have symmetric information. However, in the
case of asymmetric information, where the physician knows more than
the patient about whether malpractice occurred and can signal the oc-
currence of malpractice with an apology, the effect of apology laws on
malpractice liability risk becomes theoretically ambiguous. This theoreti-
cal ambiguity and possibility of perverse effects in the litigation realm are
also present in the realm of defensive medicine. In other words, it is pos-
sible that all of the impacts predicted by the intended effects hypothesis
are reversed, with treatment intensity, costs, and length of stay increas-
ing. Given this theoretical ambiguity, it is helpful to look at existing em-
pirical evidence. I, along with Van Horn and Viscusi, found that, in the
presence of asymmetric information, apology laws have perverse ef-
20 See supra Part II.B.
"' Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
122 Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 150.
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fects.2m In the context of AMI patients, asymmetric information may be
present because patients may find it difficult-following an emergency
situation-to sort out whether their injuries stemmed from their illness,
were a natural consequence of their treatment, or were caused by mal-
practice. Therefore, if AMI treatment is characterized by asymmetric in-
formation and apologies can serve as signals of malpractice, then apology
laws could have the opposite effect of noneconomic damages caps.
-. Finally, as to the no effect hypothesis, it is possible that apology laws
simply have no effect because they fail to encourage apologies. If physi-
cians are either unaware of or simply ignore apology laws and, according-
ly, do not change their behavior surrounding apologies, then apology
laws can have neither their intended nor perverse effects. While possible,
it is unlikely that apology laws simply fail to encourage apologies. First,
there is evidence that state medical societies announce the passage of an
264apology law to their members. Second, as discussed above, previous re-
search has already demonstrated that apology laws do affect litigants' be-
havior. Though these studies present conflicting evidence, each uncov-
ers statistically significant effects of apology laws, suggesting that apology
laws have some measurable effect.
D. Empirical Methodology
The goal of this empirical analysis is to identify a causal relationship
(not merely an association) between apology laws and defensive medi-
cine. In an ideal world, a laboratory experiment, in which some physi-
cians would be randomly assigned to receive the protection of an apology
law while others would receive no protection, would be used to deter-
266
mine the effect of apology laws on physician practice patterns. This
. See McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 22 (explaining that the greater the
inability of patients to trace their injury to malpractice, the greater the impact of
asymmetric information on the effect of apology laws). It is important to note that
AMI patients may suffer an injury following treatment for reasons completely
unrelated to malpractice, as AMIs themselves are obviously dangerous and all medical
treatments involve some risk that cannot be eliminated even in the complete absence
of malpractice; Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 163.
2 For example, Pennsylvania is the most recent state to pass an apology law.
Following its passage, the Pennsylvania Medical Society issued a press release, alerting
physicians in the state to the law's passage. See Press Release, Pennsylvania Medical
Society, Lawyers and Doctors Come Together and Agree It's OK to Say 'I'm 'Sorry'
(Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.newswise.com/articles/lawyers-and-doctors-come-
together-and-agree-it-s-ok-to-say-i-m-sorry; see also Andis Robeznieks, New Pa. Law
Encourages Doc Apologies, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.
modernhealthcare.com/ article/20131023/MODERNPHYSICIAN/310239974.
2 See McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 40.
. See Shahar Dillbary et al., Regulatory Avoidance and Suicide: An Empirical
Analysis, 92 IND. L.J. 1, 24 (forthcoming 2017) (referring to a laboratory experiment
as the "gold standard"); Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical
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would facilitate clean statistical analyses between the treatment (apology
law) and control (no apology law) groups. While a laboratory experiment
is not possible for both practical and ethical reasons, it is possible to ex-
ploit what is sometimes referred to as a natural experiment to draw in-
ferences about the effect of particular laws. In this "experiment," the
units of observation (or subjects) are individual hospital stays for AMI pa-
tients, and the "treatment" is the passage of an apology law which is de-
termined by individual states.
Based on the application of the treatment to the subjects, it is possi-
ble to estimate the impact of apology laws on the practice of defensive
medicine, assuming that all else is equal. In a laboratory with random as-
signment- of the -treatment -and - all -else being equal, and -the control
group provides a counterfactual against which to compare the treated
group. Outside of the laboratory, however, all else may not be equal. Be-
cause there may be some common factor that both systematically affects
which hospital stays are covered by apology laws and impacts the out-
come of interest, there is no valid counterfactual against which to com-
pare the treated group. Accordingly, a straightforward comparison of
those patient stays that were covered by an apology law and those that
were not will not necessarily yield valid estimates of the effect of apology
laws. It is possible to compare AMI hospital stays in a single state that
passed an apology law before and after this passage. This results in com-
paring hospital stays in two environments that are very similar to one an-
other; they are both in the same state, but one is covered by an apology
law and the other is not. From the differences in outcome measures-
treatments received, costs, length of stay, and mortality-it is possible to
infer the effect of the apology law. However, a simple before and after
comparison is problematic because physician treatment patterns, health
care norms, the disease burden of the population, and many other fac-
tors are almost certainly changing over time for many different reasons.
Disentangling the impact of these other factors from the impact of an
apology law on the outcome measures would be impossible.
To create a more convincing counterfactual group against which to
compare the treated group, social scientists routinely use a difference-in-
differences modeling approach. Specifically, researchers can construct a
comparison group that is comprised of states that are subject to all of the
same time-varying factors but are not "treated" with an apology law. By
examining the outcome measures in this comparison group, it is possible
to determine how the outcome measures would have trended over time
in response to changes in factors that are unrelated to apology laws. By
comparing the trends in the outcome measures over time across the
Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 364 (2015) [hereinafter Frakes, The Surprising
Relevance] (discussing idealized laboratory settings when examining the impact of
changes in laws).
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treated and non-treated groups, it is possible to account for these fac-
tors-even if it is impossible to observe the factors themselves-and
thereby isolate the amount of change in a given outcome measure that is
attributable to apology laws.
In mathematical terms, a simple difference-in-differences approach
involves the following. First, the difference in a relevant outcome meas-
ure before and after the passage of an apology law in states that adopted
such a law is calculated. Second, this calculation is repeated for the states
that did not pass an apology law. Next, the difference in the differences
calculated in the first two steps is taken. This difference in differences al-
lows researchers to effectively net out the unobservable factors that may
affect the outcome measure and isolate the effect of apology laws on this
267
outcome measure. When estimating the effect of apology laws on the
practice of defensive medicine, I use a substantially more complex ap-
proach than that described above by estimating empirical models that
draw on the staggered adoption of partial apology laws in 31 states and
full apology laws in five states over a 13-year time frame. While the em-
pirical models estimated in the primary analysis are more complex and
much richer than the simple difference-in-differences calculation de-
scribed above, this description captures the essence of the models re-
ported below.
Throughout my analysis, I estimate ordinary least squares ("OLS")
regression models, and the full specification of the empirical model is
reported and discussed in the technical appendix. I examine several dif-
ferent outcomes of interest, captured by several different dependent var-
iables in the OLS regressions. First, when examining the treatment
choices made by physicians, the dependent variable is an indicator varia-
ble for whether a particular treatment was chosen-indicator variables
take the value of one if the relevant treatment was chosen and zero oth-
erwise. Second, when looking at resource use, the dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of costs and the natural logarithm of length of
" To take a relatively simple example, consider states one and two. Before the
passage of an apology law, the rate of a certain type of treatment is 10 in state one
and 20 in state two. State one passes an apology law, while state two does not. After
the passage of this law, the rate of treatment in state one is 50, and the rate of
treatment in state two is 40. The simple difference-in-differences calculation here is:
(50 - 10) - (40 - 20) = 20. This result is different than if one simply compared state
one with itself before and after the passage of the apology law (50 - 10 = 40) or if one
simply compared the two states after state one passed its apology law (50 - 40 = 10).
2m Because a difference-in-differences model generates estimates of the effect of
apology laws based on states changing their laws, more changes in state laws mean
better estimates of the underlying effect. With over 30 states changing between 1999
and 2011, the models estimated in this study exploit more than enough state
variation to generate valid estimates of the effects of apology laws. See Frakes, The
Surprising Relevance, supra note 266, at 363 (using only 25 state law changes).
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stay.N' Finally, when examining quality of care by looking at deaths, the
dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the pa-
tient died.
The independent variable of interest is an indicator that takes the
value of one if a state had an apology law in place in a given year. The
coefficient on this variable is the difference-in-differences estimator de-
scribed above and captures the effect of apology laws on different out-
comes of interest. Throughout the analysis, I report results with a single
apology law indicator variable as well as results with separate indicator
variables for partial and full apology laws. In addition to the apology law
variables, the empirical model includes a series of control variables to ac-
count for other- factors that may influence-the outcomes-of interest. First,
at the individual patient level, the models include variables (determined
at the time of admission) for the patient's sex, the patient's age, and the
square of the patient's age. The models also include the constituent parts
of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, as discussed above, and indicator
variables for whether a patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or
private insurance. Second, at the hospital level, a series of indicator vari-
ables captures the type of hospital where the patient was treated, as dis-
cussed above. Third, the models control for the effects of other tort re-
forms. An indicator for whether a state had a noneconomic damages cap
in place controls for the effect of that reform, and a separate variable
controls for the other tort reforms discussed above."o Finally, all of the
models include hospital and year fixed effects. The inclusion of these var-
iables is the key to estimating a difference-in-differeices model as de-
scribed above.2 7 ' Throughout the analysis, I account for the NIS's stratifi-
cation by weighting each observation by a discharge weight, and I cluster
the standard errors at the state level.
' Both of these variables exhibit substantial right skews. It is standard practice
in the literature to take the natural logarithm of a variable to transform it from a
skewed distribution to a more normal distribution. See, e.g., Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Refonn, supra note 26; Frakes, The Surprising
Relevance, supra note 266, at 368; see also Dillbary et al., supra note 269, at 26-27 n.124.
2o See supra Part III.B.
271 Instead of state fixed effects, I include hospital fixed effects. It is not possible
to include both state and hospital fixed effects, as they are perfectly collinear.
Hospital fixed effects are preferred to state fixed effects because they eliminate more
heterogeneity and generate more precisely estimated results. See Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26 (discussing a preference for
hospital fixed effects over state fixed effects). However, I have estimated all of the
models reported below with state fixed effects with little change in the results.
212 To address the possibility that the rate of PTCA, the rate of CABG, LOS, and
other outcomes are correlated within a particular state, I estimate standard errors
clustered at the state level. See Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust
Differences-In-Ihfferences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. EcoN. 249, 258 (2004) (noting that
clustering can address the problem of serial autocorrelation).
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E. Results and Discussion
This section reports the main results of my empirical analysis. In the
interest of clarity, only the estimated coefficients for the apology law vari-
ables are reported here. Throughout this section, all of the results tables
are organized the same way. Each column of each table reports the re-
sults from a single regression. The first three columns in each table re-
port the results for a single apology law variable that takes the value of
one if a state had either a partial or full apology law in place in a given
year. The last three columns in each table report results with separate in-
dicator variables for partial and full apology laws. While all of the report-
ed models include hospital and year fixed effects, they incrementally add
control variables in order to provide a complete picture of the empirical
evidence on apology laws.
1. Treatment Choice Results
Table 1 reports the results of regression models that estimate the
probability that an AMI patient receives any intensive treatment, i.e.,
PTCA or CABG, instead of medical management. Because both the de-
pendent variable and the apology law variables are indicators, the re-
ported coefficients can be interpreted as percentage point changes in the
probability that the patient receives any intensive treatment. For exam-
ple, the reported coefficient in column (3) can be understood as a 0.4
percentage point decrease in the probability that an AMI patient receives
either PTCA or CABG. However, neither this coefficient, nor any coeffi-
cient in the six reported models, is statistically significant. In other words,
I find no statistical evidence that apology laws reduce the practice of de-
fensive medicine. Across the entire sample of AMI patients, approximate-
ly 45.5% receive one of these intensive treatments. Thus, even ignoring
the lack of statistical significance, apology laws have negligible effects on
the probability a patient receives an intensive treatment.274 Overall, I find
no evidence that apology laws decrease treatment intensity generally and
thus no evidence that these laws reduce the practice of defensive medi-
cine.
273 More specifically, for a given coefficient #, the interpretation is that enacting
an apology law produced a (100 x fl) percentage point change in the probability that
the patient receives either PTCA or CABG.
274 A 0.5 percentage point change corresponds to only a 1.1% change in the
average probability of receiving an intensive treatment.
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Table 1: Effect of Apology Laws on the Probability of Receiving a
Major Intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Partial -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
Apology Law
(0.006) . (0.005) (0.006)








Observations 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339
R-squared 0.312 0.386 0.386 0.312 0.386 0.386
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
received either percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty ("PTCA") or coro-
nary artery bypass grafting ("CABG"). "Control variables" include an indicator varia-
ble for whether the patient was female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's
age; indicators for whether the patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private
insurance; and the constituent parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are
based on the diagnoses associated with a given patient. Also within "control variables"
are a series of indicator variables for hospital type including: public, not-for-profit,
for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medium, and small. "Other Tort reforms" include an
indicator for whether a state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indi-
cator for whether the following had been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint
and several liability reform, punitive damages caps, and collateral source rule reform.
All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects and are weighted by the dis-
charge weights included in the NIS. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state
correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. * statistically significant at
the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at
the 1% level.
To further explore the impact of apology laws on the practice of de-
fensive medicine, I separately estimate the effects of these laws on the
probability of receiving different intensive treatments. Table 2 reports
regression results with an indicator variable for whether the patient re-
ceives PTCA as the dependent variable. Across all of the models reported
in Table 2, there is no statistically significant evidence that apology laws
affect physicians' decisions to treat patients with PTCA, meaning these
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laws do not reduce the practice of defensive medicine. Table 3 reports
results with an indicator for whether the patient receives CABG as the
dependent variable. I again find no statistically significant effect of the
general apology law variable or the partial apology law variable; however,
full apology laws have a consistently statistically significant effect on the
probability that patients receive CABG, increasing this probability by be-
tween 0.9 and 1.1 percentage points.
Table 2: Effect of Apology Laws on the Probability of Receiving PTCA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws -0.003 -0.006 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Partial
Apology Law -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Full Apology
Law -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Control




Observations 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339
R-squared 0.219 0.292 0.292 0.219 0.292 0.292
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
received percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty ("PTCA"). "Control varia-
bles" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was female; the age of the
patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the patient was covered by
Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent parts of the Charlson
Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associated with a given patient.
Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator variables for hospital type in-
cluding: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medium, and small.
"Other Tort reforms" include an indicator for whether a state had enacted a noneco-
nomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the following had been enacted:
periodic payment reform, joint and several liability reform, punitive damages caps,
and collateral source rule reform. All regressions include hospital and year fixed ef-
fects and are weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Robust standard
errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in paren-
theses. * statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5%
level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Effect of Apology Laws on the Probability of Receiving CABG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Partial 0.001 0.001 0.000
Apology Law
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)








Observations 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339
R-squared 0.068 0.080 0.080 0.068 0.080 0.080
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
received coronary artery bypass grafting ("CABG"). "Control variables" include an
indicator variable for whether the patient was female; the age of the patient; the
square of patient's age; indicators for whether the patient was covered by Medicare,
Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent parts of the Charlson Comorbidi-
ty Index, which are based on the diagnoses associated with a given patient. Also with-
in "control variables" are a series of indicator variables for hospital type including:
public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medium, and small. "Other
Tort reforms" include an indicator for whether a state had enacted a noneconomic
damages cap, and an indicator for whether the following had been enacted: periodic
payment reform, joint and several liability reform, punitive damages caps, and collat-
eral source rule reform. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects and are
weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Robust standard errors cor-
rected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. *
statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level;
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Because the CABG results in Table 3 are somewhat stronger than the
other treatment choice results, I perform a series of statistical tests to
evaluate the robustness of these results. The specifics of these tests are
reported in the Technical Appendix, but the important point is that the
effect of full apology laws on the probability of receiving CABG is not ro-
bust. For example, full apology laws have a stronger positive effect on the
probability of receiving CABG on three or four arteries than on the
probability of receiving CABG on one or two arteries, despite the fact
that physicians often have little discretion when choosing among proce-
dures to treat three or more blocked arteries. Similarly, implementing
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slight changes to the model that are standard in the literature erases the
statistically significant effects of full apology laws on the probability that
patients are treated with CABG. Overall, the robustness checks suggest
that this effect should be interpreted with skepticism.
Across all of the treatment choice results, I find no consistent evi-
dence that apology laws of either type affect the intensity of treatment
received by heart attack patients and thus no evidence that these laws re-
duce the practice of defensive medicine. The estimated effects of apology
laws contrast with the effects of noneconomic damages caps estimated by
Avraham and Schanzenbach, who find consistent and statistically signifi-
cant evidence that caps reduce treatment intensity. Though the effects
of apology laws are similar in size and direction to those of noneconomic
damages caps, the effects of apology laws are almost never statistically
significant, meaning that these effects are statistically indistinguishable
from no effect. This general lack of statistical significance is not con-
sistent with the intended effect of apology laws, as these laws are de-
signed to have a meaningful impact on malpractice risk and thereby at-
tenuate the practice of defensive medicine.
2. Resource Use Results
Table 4 reports regressions with the natural logarithm of total costs
277
as the dependent variable. Though none of the estimated effects are -
statistically significant, every coefficient is positive, implying that, if any-
thing, apology laws increase the costs associated with treatment. Because
the cost variable is in logarithmic form and the apology law variables are
indicators, the coefficients reported in Table 4 can be interpreted as per-
centage changes.1" For example, in column (6), the partial and full
apology law coefficients can be understood as 1% and 1.1% increases, re-
spectively. As with the treatment choice results, the evidence for the ef-
fect of apology laws on costs contrasts with the evidence for noneconom-
ic damages caps reported by Avraham and Schanzenbach. Where
Avraham and Schanzenbach found a statistically significant decrease in
costs as a result of noneconomic damages caps, I find a statistically insig-
nificant increase in costs as a result of apology laws.179
2 Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
1 The one exception to this pattern of statistical insignificance does not survive
the robustness checks to which it is subjected, meaning that the only evidence that
apology laws work as intended should be interpreted with skepticism.
277 I examine the natural logarithm because of the substantial right skew in the
cost variable. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
More specifically, because the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the
marginal effect of an indicator variable with coefficient is approximately (exp(f) -
1)(100)%. Robert Halvorsen & Raymond Palmquist, The Interpretation of Dummy
Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 474, 474 (1980).
" Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
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Table 4: Effect of Apology Laws on Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.008 0.009 0.010
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Partial Apology
Law 0.007 0.008 0.010
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Full Apology.
Law 0.013 0.011 0.011
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Control




Observations 1,236,865 1,236,733 1,236,733 1,236,865 1,236,733 1,236,733
R-squared 0.269 0.296 0.296 0.269 0.296 0.296
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of costs per treated patient.
"Control variables" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was female;
the age of the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the patient
was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent parts of
the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associated with a
given patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator variables for
hospital type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medi-
um, and small. "Other Tort reforms" include an indicator for whether a state had en-
acted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the following had
been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint and several liability reform, punitive
damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. All regressions include hospital and
year fixed effects and are weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Ro-
bust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are re-
ported in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
To further address changes in resource use following the passage-of
apology laws, Table 5 reports results with the natural logarithm of length
of stay as the dependent variable. Apology laws have a consistently statis-
tically significant and positive effect on length of stay. As with the cost re-
gressions reported above, the individual coefficients may be interpreted
as percentage increases because the dependent variable is in logarithmic
form. Specifically, in columns (1)-(3), passing any apology law causes
length of stay to increase by between 2.7% and 3.3%. In columns (4)-
(6), partial apology laws increase length of stay by between 2% and 2.7%,
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while full apology laws increase length of stay by between 4.5% and 5.9%.
Given a mean length of stay across the entire sample of about 5.3 days,
apology laws increase the time spent in the hospital by between 2.6 and
7.5 hours. While these are relatively small increases, any increase in
length of stay suggests that apology laws increase the resources used to
care for AMI patients, which is inconsistent with these laws reducing the
practice of defensive medicine.
Table 5: Effect of Apology Laws on Length of Stay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Partial 0.020* 0.027** 0.024**
Apology Law
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009)








Observations 1,598,137 1,597,976 1,597,976 1,598,137 1,597,976 1,597,976
R-squared 0.079 0.202 0.203 0.079 0.203 0.203
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of length of stay for each pa-
tient. "Control Variables" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was
female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the
patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent
parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associat-
ed with a given patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator varia-
bles for hospital type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural,
large, medium, and small. "Other Tort reforms" include an indicator for whether a
state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the fol-
lowing had been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint and several liability reform,
punitive damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. All regressions include
hospital and year fixed effects and are weighted by the discharge weights included in
the NIS. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error
term are reported in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Because of the important implications of the length of stay results
and because these coefficients are the only ones to be consistently statis-
tically significant, I investigate the robustness of these results in several
ways. The details and results of this investigation are discussed in the
Technical Appendix, but overall, I find strong and consistent evidence
that the effect of apology laws on length of stay is robust and therefore
represents a true effect. For example, these results remain largely un-
changed when the empirical models are altered, and more importantly, I
find a clear pattern that the average length of stay steadily increases in
the years following the passage of an apology law when there was no such
pattern of increase prior to the passage of the law.
Overall, the evidence suggests that apology laws increase-the resources
used to treat heart attack patients. In stark contrast to the effects of non-
economic damages caps, apology laws increase the costs associated with
treating AMI patients, though, as with treatment choice, these effects are
not statistically significant. More important, however, is the positive and
consistently significant effect apology laws have on length of stay. At its
core, defensive medicine involves physicians making small decisions eve-
ry day that increase the resources used to treat individual patients. If
apology laws decreased malpractice pressure, physicians could be slightly
more comfortable sending patients home a little earlier-indeed, the
general trend between 1999 and 2011 was to send patients home earlier.
However, apology laws incite exactly the opposite approach from physi-
210
cians, as they keep patients in the hospital longer. Increasing resource
use in response to a law that purports to reduce malpractice risk supports
281
the perverse effects hypothesis outlined above.
3. Quality of Care Results
Table 6 reports regression results where the dependent variable is an
2812
indicator for whether the patient died. The reported coefficients in
280 This raises the obvious question of why physicians would continue to
apologize if doing so increases their malpractice risk and ultimately causes them to
expend more resources when treating patients. This important question is addressed
in Section IV.A, infra.
2" An alternative interpretation of the resource use results is that apology laws
simply increase the amount of care delivered to heart attack patients, consistent with
an increase in the quality of care. However, this interpretation is ruled out in the next
section, which demonstrates that, even with more resources used, heart attack
patients are more likely to die following the passage of apology laws. An increase in
mortality is not consistent with heart attack patients receiving better care.
282 Some disagreement exists in the literature about whether it is appropriate to
use the NIS to count deaths related to AMIs. Dhankar et al., supra note 149, at 166,
use the measure of mortality provided by the NIS. However, Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26, instead use death rates from
both coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction from the National Vital
Statistics Mortality files. I examine the mortality rates reported in the NIS because
doing so allows me to (1) use all of the same control variables as in other parts of the
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Table 6 can be interpreted as percentage point changes in the probabil-
ity of death. Though the estimated coefficients are generally close to ze-
ro, there is some statistically significant evidence that apology laws in-
crease the risk of dying. Based on the results in column (6), the positive
effect of apology laws on mortality stems primarily from full apology laws,
as this coefficient is statistically significant, while the coefficient for par-
tial apology laws is not. In general, the evidence suggests that apology
laws may increase the probability of death by 0.2 percentage points-0.4
percentage points in the case of full apology laws. While a small effect, a
0.4 percentage point increase is not insubstantial, given a death rate of
only 6.8%.m This result is inconsistent with the effect of noneconomic
damages caps, which reduce mortality rates.28
To test whether the counterintuitive effect of apology laws on death
rates is spurious, I perform several robustness checks. As with the length
of stay results, the effect of apology laws on mortality survives the series of
robustness checks to which I subject it, suggesting that death rates in-
crease in the wake of apology laws. Thus, consistent with the perverse ef-
fects hypothesis, apology laws adversely impact the care received by pa-
tients. Overall, the weight of the evidence supports the perverse effects
hypothesis. The implications of these results are explored in the next sec-
tion.
analysis and (2) focus specifically on deaths related to AMIs-neither of these is
possible when using other datasets.
2 This represents a 6% increase.
2 Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 26.
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Table 6: Effect of Apology Laws on Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Law 0.001 0.002 0.002
. - (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Full Apology
Law 0.003 0.003 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Control
Variables X X X x
Other Tort
Reforms x x
Observations 1,650,016 1,649,831 1,649,831 1,650,016 1,649,831 1,649,831
R-squared 0.010 0.044 0.044 0.010 0.044 0.044
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
died. "Control variables" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was
female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the
patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent
parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associat-
ed with a given patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator varia-
bles for hospital type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural,
large, medium, and small. "Other Tort reforms" include an indicator for whether a
state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the fol-
lowing had been enacted: periodic payment reform,joint and several liability reform,
punitive damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. All regressions include
hospital and year fixed effects and are weighted by the discharge weights included in
the NIS. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error
term are reported in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Reviewing the evidence presented here,-there is little to suggest that
apology laws work as intended. Indeed, the evidence indicates that apol-
ogy laws increase the practice of defensive medicine, consistent with the
perverse effects hypothesis. To be clear, the intended effect of apology
laws is to facilitate settlements and reduce the filing of medical malprac-
tice claims, but an important corollary to this intended effect is the re-
duction of the practice of defensive medicine. However, the results re-
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ported above do not suggest that physicians react to the passage of apol-
ogy laws in ways consistent with their risk of medical malpractice liability
declining, and much of the evidence suggests physicians react to the pas-
sage of apology laws consistent with their risk of medical malpractice lia-
bility increasing.
Though perhaps omewhat surprising given the demonstrated bene-
fits of apologies, the perverse effects of apology laws on defensive medi-
cine are consistent with some of the previous findings regarding the im-
pact of apology laws on medical malpractice litigation. More important
than their consistency with existing evidence, however, the perverse ef-
fects of apology laws demonstrated above raise three significant ques-
tions. First, what explains these perverse effects? Second, where should
lawmakers go from here? Third, what should physicians do with the exist-
ing evidence on apology laws? This section addresses these questions in
turn.
A. Exploring the Perverse Effects of Apology Laws
When examining the failure of apology laws to have their intended
effect on the practice of defensive medicine, it is useful to begin by focus-
ing on the disconnect between apologies, which have consistently been
shown to reduce the frequency and severity of malpractice claims, and
apology laws, for which there is mixed evidence. That disconnect may
stem from one aspect of apology laws that has generally been omitted
from prior examinations of apologies: asymmetric information.m As not-
ed above, asymmetric information exists when one party possesses more
information than the other party. In the context of medical malpractice,
relevant asymmetric information occurs when a physician possesses more
information than the patient about whether malpractice occurred. Given
the vulnerability of patients around the time they suffer an AMI and the
many avenues through which an injury or other adverse outcome can oc-
cur-many of which involve no malpractice by the physician-
determining whether malpractice occurred from the patient's point of
view may be relatively difficult. An apology from a physician may signal
the occurrence of malpractice to a patient who otherwise would not have
discovered it. That apology may also embolden a patient in her conclu-
sion that malpractice has occurred when she may have otherwise been
unsure. Even if the apology itself is protected by an apology law, the pa-
tient is free to search for other admissible evidence. If apologies from
"5 See Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 155-58; see also McMichael et al., supra note 11,
at 27-31.
2 To date, no experimental study of apologies has explicitly considered the
potential role of asymmetric information, though some studies have addressed a
somewhat related problem. See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 492 (discussing a
paradox related to asymmetric information).
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physicians routinely signal the occurrence of malpractice, then apology
laws, which facilitate these apologies, will increase malpractice liability
risk.28 And an increase in this risk could easily account for the perverse
effects reported above.
If the presence of asymmetric information is driving the perverse ef-
fects reported above, that begs the question: why has asymmetric infor-
mation not caused perverse effects in the myriad apology and disclosure
programs at individual hospitals? The answer likely lies in the nature .of
these programs versus the nature of apology laws. These programs are
generally implemented at well-heeled academic institutions or other
large hospitals that have the resources to train physicians on exactly how
2881
and. when to apologize. -From --these programs, physicians may learn
what to say and when to say it, learn how to avoid "botched apologies," 25
and receive the support of trained staff. If they are able to communi-
cate effectively with patients, physicians may be able to signal the occur-
rence of malpractice in a way that still assuages patient anger or assuages
patient anger without conveying any signal at all. Effective communica-
tion could mitigate the role of asymmetric information and avoid the
perverse effect of increasing the propensity of patients to sue.
More generally, Erin O'Hara O'Connor conducted a thorough re-
view of the existing literature on apologies across a variety of disciplines.
Though she focused on organizational apologies, the lessons from her
work also apply in the physician-patient context. She identified four key
components of an effective apology: (1) "the identification of a wrongful
act;" (2) "an expression of remorse;" (3) "a promise to forbear future
transgressions;" and (4) "an offer to repair the damages in some way."2
On the other hand, O'Hara O'Connor explains, ineffective apologies of-
ten involve one or more of the following: (1) a delay in making the apol-
ogy; (2) the use of a passive medium (such as a written apoloV); or (3)
an unwillingness to accept the burden of one's wrongdoing. Without
understanding these important lessons through training, practice, and
support, physicians may offer apologies that ultimately exacerbate their
problems following a medical error rather than assuaging patient anger
and reducing the risk of facing malpractice claims. In contrast to the
carefully developed training and support physicians receive as part of
specific programs, apology laws provide no guidance at all on how or
when to apologize. This lack of guidance could easily explain the failure
McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 29-30, found evidence of this effect.
288 Mello et al., supra note 4, at 2149-50.
28" See Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead, Say You're Sorry, PScYHOL. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995,
at 76-78 (discussing botched apologies).
200 See Boothman et al., supra note 66, at 145.
2" Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Organizational Apologies: BP as a Case Study, 64 VAND.
L. REv. 1959, 1965 (2011).
22 Id. at 1982.
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of apology laws to generalize the benefits observed in connection with
specific apology programs.
Additionally, the problems that arise from a lack of training are
compounded by confusion surrounding apology laws themselves. Indeed,
legal scholars have criticized apology laws for failing to protect the type
of information patients often desire when hearing their physicians apol-
ogize.29 Anna Mastroianni and several co-authors explain that injured
patients "seek[] not only an expression of sympathy but also information
about the nature of the event and why it happened.",4 Mastroianni and
her team further explain that physicians may not understand what as-
2915
pects of an apologetic statement are protected.
Two state court cases decided after Mastroianni and colleagues
penned their critique of apology laws support their arguments. In Davis
v. Wooster Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine, an Ohio appellate court was con-
fronted with the question of how to interpret the state's apology law.29
In that case, an orthopedic surgeon who had caused the death of a pa-
tient following surgery explained that "he nicked an artery and that he
took full responsibility [for it]."" The physician argued that this admis-
sion of fault fell within the ambit of Ohio's partial apology law. 29 The
court disagreed with the physician, and in reachinq this conclusion, the
court relied on multiple canons of construction. 9 While the court's
analysis was sound, it is unreasonable to expect physicians to engage in
lengthy statutory interpretation before deciding exactly what they will say
when apologizing to patients. Along the same lines, a case in a Utah ap-
pellate court similarly illustrates the confusing nature of apology laws. In
Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, the Court of Appeals of Utah con-
cluded, after a lengthy and detailed statutory interpretation, that some of
the statements made by the defendants were protected by Utah's apology
law, while others were not.i0 Together, these cases demonstrate that
apology laws lack the clarity necessary to provide physicians with the type
.. See Anna C. Mastroianni et al., The Flaws in State 'Apology' and Disclosure' Laws
Dilute Their Intended Impact on Malpractice Suits, 29 HEALTHAFF. 1611, 1614 (2010)
("[M]ost apology laws do not protect, the key information that patients want
communicated to them following an unanticipated outcome.").
2" Id. at 1614-15.
.. Id. at 1616.
" Davis v. Wooster Orthopaedics & Sports Med., 952 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2011).
" Id. at 1221.
" Unlike other states with similar laws, Ohio's apology law does not specifically
exempt admissions of fault from the protection afforded by the law. See O.R.C. §
2317.43.
2' Davis, 952 N.E.2d at 1220-21.
" Lawrence v. MountainStar Health Care, 320 P.3d 1037, 1051-52 (Utah CL
App. 2014).
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of guidance they need when apologizing.o1
This lack of guidance can lead to confusion which can, in turn, lead
to poorly executed apologies. Mastroianni and colleagues explained that
a poorly executed apology may involve "[m]erely expressing sympathy
without sharing information about an injury's cause and prevention or
accepting responsibility may strike patients as insincere, provoking rather
than appeasing a potential plaintiff."o2 If physicians fail to understand
what is protected and how to apologize, they may suffer all of the ill ef-
fects associated with apologizing (i.e., conveying a signal to an injured
patient that malpractice has occurred) and enjoy none of the benefits
(i.e., assuaging the patient's anger and dissuading legal action).30 This
critique obviously-applies to partial-apologylaws,- but it also explains the-
perverse effects associated with full apology laws. Physicians may simply
not understand how much they can say under the protection of these
laws and omit important information when speaking with patients. Over-
all, the absence of any training that would enable physicians to effectively
apologize, the presence of asymmetric information which allows apolo-
gies to serve as signals of malpractice, and the general confusion over
what is protected and how apology laws operate can explain why they in-
crease malpractice risk, and thus increase the practice of defensive medi-
cine. However, this raises the obvious question of why physicians would
continue to apologize, consistent with the goal of apology laws, if doing
so raises, not lowers, their malpractice risk. There are two reasons why
this may be the case.
First, as discussed in detail above, much of the academic and popular
press coverage of apologies and apology laws has touted the benefits of
these laws in alleviating medical malpractice liability risk. Long advised
not to apologize following an error, physicians could have easily seen re-
ports of how apology laws would change this culture and rushed to apol-
ogize in the wake of an error-even if they did not know how to do so ef-
fectively. They may also have rushed to apologize without fully
understanding the nuances of apologies following medical errors based
on various advocacy groups' support of apologies as dispute resolution
"' The lack of clarity is further illustrated in a subsequent decision reached by
the Supreme Court of Ohio. That court disagreed with the lower Ohio court, holding
that an apology under Ohio's apology law could "include an acknowledgment that
the patient's medical care fell below the standard of care" even though the statutory
language does not include such statements within its ambit of protection. Stewart v.
Vivian, 91 N.E.3d 716, 720-22 (Ohio 2017).
0 Mastroianni et al., supra note 293, at 1616.
'0 See also id. ("[L]aws that protect only expressions of sympathy and explanation
may make for awkward communications, as it may be difficult to explain an error
without discussing the different but closely related issues of responsibility or fault.").
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mechanisms.so Second, following the passage of an apology law (and the
popular clinical and academic discussions surrounding these laws), a cul-
ture change may have occurred in which physicians are simply expected
to apologize. If such a culture change took place based on contempora-
neously available evidence, physicians may have continued to apologize
in the absence of any evidence suggesting that doing so actually increases
malpractice risk.
B. Recommendation for Legislatures: Look Elsewhere
Apologies remain an important aspect of human interaction, and
none of the results presented here undermine the moral role of apolo-
gies or the role that apologies can play in assuaging individual anger or
in healing communities, following a transgression. Prior legal and psy-
chological research is clear that apologies have an important part to play
in relationships and the reparative discourse that is so often necessary to
maintain those relationships . 30o "Humans often de-escalate conflicts with
conciliatory gestures" and "apologies can almost instantaneously erode
the anger and pain associated with transgressions."3 0 6 O'Hara O'Connor,
employing an evolutionary approach to apology, traced the role of apol-
ogies and general conciliatory behavior through primate and human be-
havior, exploring the ways in which groups address problems following a
transgression by one of their members. This work suggests that apolo-
gies are deeply ingrained in our society and will continue to play im-
portant roles far into the future. To the extent that the legal system hin-
ders or impinges upon the important part apologies play in modem
society, apology laws may be justified as important means through which
to reclaim apologies as a meaningful and necessary part of human inter-
action.
However, state legislatures historically have not appealed to these
justifications when enacting apology laws. Instead, they focus on the nar-
row ability of apology laws to encourage settlements and avoid lawsuits in
cases of medical malpractice, which is more consistent with the goals of
tort reform than with restoring apologies to the important place they
have historically occupied in individual interactions. To the extent that
legislatures justify apology laws on the narrow grounds of tort reform in
the context of medical malpractice, I find no empirical evidence support-
ing this justification. More generally, the evidence presented here and
previous evidence on the effects of apology laws raise two important poli-
a See, e.g., Our History and Mission, SORRYWORKS.NET, https:/sorryworks.
net/history-and-mission/19 (describing the history of one such advocacy
organization).
0 See O'Connor, supra note 291, at 1966.
a Id. at 1964-65.
w Id. at 1962-63.
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cy implications.3 ' First, lawmakers should reconsider the use of apology
laws to achieve the goals associated with tort reform. Second, to the ex-
tent that society would benefit from more (appropriately delivered)
apologies, lawmakers should focus on the development of specific apolo-
gy and disclosure programs.
Beginning with the role of apology laws as tort reforms, little evi-
dence recommends them as such. Some evidence suggests apology laws
reduce malpractice claim payments, but other evidence suggests that
these laws either have no effect or increase claim payments.' Two sepa-
rate studies have found that apology laws increase claim frequency to
some degree .' 0 However, while the effect of apology laws on medical
malpractice claims themselves is- undeniably -important, -increases or de-
creases in malpractice claims ultimately generate little value for society.
Payments from physicians to patients are simply transfers of funds and
generate no value in and of themselves. On the other hand, apology laws
can create or destroy value for society by encouraging or discouraging
the efficient delivery of medical care. For example, if they effectively re-
duced the practice of defensive medicine, apology laws could save wasted
resources, thereby generating social value. In contrast, if they undermine
the deterrence of the malpractice system, these laws could facilitate the
provision of poor care, thereby destroying value.
None of the evidence reported above suggests that apology laws gen-
erate value for society by discouraging the practice of defensive medi-
cine, and the weight of the evidence suggests that they increase defensive
medicine with no benefit to patients. Thus, apology laws fail as tort re-
forms in the context of heart attack patients-one of the traditional con-
texts where tort reforms are evaluated. Given this failure, lawmakers are
well advised to achieve the goals of tort reform through other means. If
lawmakers' goals align with those in favor of tort reform, noneconomic
damages caps have the most evidence to recommend them as effective
tort reforms, though that evidence is not overwhelming. If the objective
of lawmakers is to achieve the goals of tort reform without implementing
traditional, damages-centric reforms, Mello and Kachalia have reviewed a
number of other innovative reforms that states may implement.31' Addi-
tionally, the federal government has funded a number of demonstration
projects that focus on both patient safety and malpractice reduction that
"" In addition to these two important implications, continued research on
apology laws is necessary. Future work should explore the effects of apology laws on
the practice of defensive medicine in other areas of medical practice and the role of
apology laws in promoting access to health care.
m Compare Ho & Liu, supra note 6, at 160-61, and Ho & Liu, supra note 7, at 188,
with McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 31-34.
310 McMichael et al., supra note 11, at 27-31.
3 See MELLo & KAcHAHLA, supra note 21, at 61.
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states may wish to explore." While there are a number of other reform
options, the evidence available at this time suggests that apology laws are
not the best choice to achieve the goals of tort reform.
However, this is not to suggest that apologies are not a viable reform
option. The evidence reported here does not undermine prior work on
the effect of apology and disclosure programs at specific hospitals and
health systems; rather, it demonstrates that the benefits generated by
these programs are not generalizable through apology laws. And the re-
search is clear that apologies can generate a number of benefits for phy-
sicians, patients, and the health care system beyond their ability to re-
duce the frequency and severity of malpractice claims.1 Thus, states that
wish to address malpractice liability risk could encourage the adoption of
these programs at hospitals and physician practices within their borders.
One program that includes an apology and disclosure component is
the Communication and Optimal Resolution ("CANDOR") Toolkit de-
veloped by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality ("AHRQ").
"Based on expert input and lessons learned from the Agency's $23 mil-
lion Patient Safety and Medical Liability grant initiative launched in
2009, the CANDOR toolkit" provides health care organizations with the
training to, among other things, "[e]ngage patients and families in dis-
closure communication following adverse events."3 15 The CANDOR
Toolkit (and other specifically designed apology and disclosure pro-
grams) has the additional advantage that it can be adopted without state
action. However, to the extent that hospitals and practitioners can be en-
couraged to implement this program (or other programs) through the
passage of apology laws, these laws may be justified as part of a coordi-
nated effort by state legislatures to encourage the adoption of apology
and disclosure programs that can better realize the benefits of apologies
than these laws can alone.
C. Advice for Physicians: Avoid Apologizing Without Training
Prior to the advent of apology laws and the development of robust
research on the effect of apologies, attorneys generally advised their phy-
3' See AGENCY FOR HEALTHcARE REs. & QuALriY, LONGITUDINAL EvALUATION OF
THE PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL LIABILTI REFORM PROGRAM 1, 3-6 (2016),
https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/professionals/quality-patient-
safety/patient-safety-resources/resources/candor/psml-demo-grants-final-report.pdf
(reviewing currently funded demonstration projects targeted at malpractice and
patient safety).
See supra Part I.A.1.
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sician clients to avoid apologizing to injured patients. In the wake of
this research and the passage of apology laws, some commentators have
urged physicians to apologize to injured patients, contradicting tradi-
tional legal advice." While, as noted above, the intrinsic importance of
apologies in modern society is difficult to deny, the existing empirical ev-
idence on apology laws suggests that the unqualified advice urging physi-
cians to apologize to injured patients is fundamentally flawed-even
when a physician practices in a state with an apology law. The advice that
physicians should apologize in all cases makes no allowance for the pos-
sibility of asymmetric information or the nuances involved in an effective
apology. Instead of simply advising physicians to always apologize, the
better advice- is that a properly trained physician should apologize following
a medical error. This apology should be offered after the physician or
trained support staff member has evaluated the overall situation, and it
should be offered in a manner consistent with the evidence on effective
apologies.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the practice of well-trained physi-
cians offering effective apologies is becoming more common. For exam-
ple, when Jake Gentry was injured as a result of a medical error in 2013,
he received an apology from his surgeon and, based partly on this apolo-
318
gy, his injury never generated a malpractice claim. While care should
be taken to ensure that victims of medical errors are not exploited by
providers offering disingenuous apologies,1 well designed apology and
disclosure programs are becoming increasingly popular among hospitals
and other health care providers. This bodes well for both patients, many
of whom may only learn of a medical error as a result of these programs,
and health care providers, who stand to see a reduction in their overall
malpractice liability risk. Importantly, the evidence presented here sug-
gests that physicians should encourage the development of and actively
engage with these programs as they search for new ways to address medi-
cal errors and their malpractice liability risk because apology laws alone
are simply inadequate.
.16 See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 467; see also Ebert, supra note 72, at 342.
317 See Liebman & Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage, supra note 2, at 24;
Norman G. Tabler, Jr., Dealing with a Medical Mistake: Should Physicians Apologize to
Patients, MEDICAL EcoNOMics (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.medicaleconomics.com/
health-law-policy/dealing-medical-mistake-should-physicians-apologize-patients.; see
also Ebert, supra note 72, at 339.
118 See Boodman, supra note 188 (discussing Gentry's case as well as those of
other injured patients who did not receive apologies).
31 This concern underlies many of the arguments offered by Arbel & Kaplan,
supra note 7, at 1202. See also Boodman, supra note 188 (noting the concerns that
apology and disclosure "programs may take advantage of vulnerable patients who are
not represented by a lawyer.").
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CONCLUSION
Despite not being labeled as such by the state legislatures that have
enacted them, apology laws are a new generation of tort reform. Because
apology laws function as tort reforms and because they have outstripped
traditional reforms in popularity among the states, placing them squarely
within the tort reform debate has become increasingly important. More
important, however, is developing the empirical evidence necessary to
properly evaluate apology laws as tort reforms. This Article addressed
both of these needs.
Apology laws function as tort reforms, but the way they influence
medical malpractice claims and, in turn, the practice of defensive medi-
cine is quite different than traditional reforms. These laws encourage
physicians to apologize and rely on the ability of apologies to soothe an
injured patient's anger and thereby decrease the patient's propensity to
pursue a malpractice claim. However, an apology may actually increase
an injured patient's propensity to sue if it signals to that patient the oc-
currence of malpractice. Thus, apology laws rely on a very different and
less predictable mechanism than traditional tort reform. Understanding
this mechanism will allow lawmakers to make better and more informed
decisions on the utility and desirability of apology laws as tort reforms.
Because the theoretical effect of apology laws on physicians' risk of
medical malpractice liability and, therefore, their practice of defensive
medicine is ambiguous, this Article provided the first empirical analysis
of the effects of apology laws on the practice of defensive medicine. Us-
ing a dataset covering over 1.6 million hospital stays, this Article's analysis
focused on the treatment received by heart attack patients. In general,
the evidence demonstrated that apology laws fail to discourage the prac-
tice of defensive medicine-even in a medical context where other tort
reforms have succeeded. Indeed, these laws intensify the practice of de-
fensive medicine, -as the time patients spend in the hospital increases by
up to 5% in the presence of these laws. And this additional defensive
medicine does not appear to benefit patients, as some evidence suggest-
ed apology laws increase the probability of dying following treatment for
an AMI.
Overall, while apologies can effectively accomplish some of the goals
of tort reform, apology laws cannot effectively do so. If states wish to
achieve these goals, traditional tort reforms are likely a better option;
however, encouraging the development of specific apology and disclo-
sure programs has the potential to both achieve the goals of tort reform
and generate the benefits associated with apologies. Similarly, physicians
should actively seek out these programs if they wish to generate and en-
joy the benefits associated with apologies, as apology laws alone are simp-
ly inadequate.
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FULL MODEL SPECIFICATION
Throughout my analysis, I estimate ordinary least squares ("OLS")
regressions. The following equation captures the general form of the
empirical model that is the basis of my analysis:
Y1s = /apology lawst + Apatient characteristicsihst + Shospital characteristicshst +
t9other tort reformsst + 93h + Tt + East*
In this equation, i indexes individual hospital stays, h indexes hospitals, s
indexes states, and t indexes years. The dependent variable, Y, takes vari-
ous forms throughout the analysis. First, when examining the treatment
choices made by physicians, it is an indicator variable for whether a par-
ticular treatment was chosen-indicator variables take the value one if
the relevant treatment was chosen and zero otherwise. In the equations
where Y is an indicator variable, I am estimating linear probability mod-
els ("LPMs").a3o2 Second, when looking at resource use, Y is the natural
3212
logarithm of costs and the natural logarithm of length of stay. Finally,
when examining quality of care by looking at deaths, Y is an indicator
variable that takes the value one if the patient died.
The variable apology law is an indicator variable that takes the value
one if a state had an apology law in place in a given year. The coefficient
,8 is the difference-in-differences estimator described in the main text and
captures the effect of apology laws. Throughout the analysis, I report re-
sults with a single apology law indicator variable as well as results with
separate indicator variables for partial and full apology laws. Turning to
the control variables, patient characteristics includes an indicator variable
for whether the patient was female and the age of the patient.sm Also in-
cluded in patient characteristics are the constituent parts of the Charlson
' See Benjamin Ho and Elaine Liu, What's an Apology Worth? Decomposing the Effect
of Apologies on Medical Malpractice Payments Using State Apology Laws, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L.
STUD. 179, 190 (2011) (discussing a preference for LPMs over other models such as
logit and probit); see also Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort
Reform on Intensity of Treatment: Evidence from Heart Patients, 39 J. HEALTH ECON. 273
(2015) [hereinafter Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform] (estimating
LPMs).
2 Both of these variables exhibit substantial right skews. It is standard practice in
the literature to take the natural logarithm of a variable to transform it from a skewed
distribution to a more normal distribution. See, e.g., Avraham & Schanzenbach, The
Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 1; Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of
Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. Cm. L. REV. 317, 368 (2015) [hereinafter Frakes, The
Surprising Relevance]; see also Shahar Dillbary et al., Regulatory Avoidance and Suicide: An
Empirical Analysis, 92 IND. L.J. 24, 26 n.124 (forthcoming 2017).
' The age variable also enters as a quadratic term. See Avraham & Schanzenbach,
The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 1.
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Comorbidity Index, as discussed in the main text, and indicator variables
for whether a patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private in-
surance. Next, hospital characteristics includes a series of indicator variables
that capture the type of hospital where the patient is treated, as discussed
in the main text. Included in other tort reforms is an indicator for whether a
state had a noneconomic damages cap in place, and a variable that con-
trols for the other tort reforms discussed in the main text. Next, <p and
r are vectors of hospital and year fixed effects, respectively. The inclusion
of this series of variables for different hospitals and years is the key to es-
timating a difference-in-differences model as described in the main
text.4 5 Finally, I account for the NIS's stratification by weighting each




As noted in Section III.E.1 of the main text, I subject the results re-
ported in Table 3--particularly the result that full apology laws have a
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability a patient re-
ceives CABG-to a series of robustness checks. I first examine the impact
of apology laws separately on the probability of receiving CABG on one
or two arteries and on the probability of receiving it on three or four. As
noted in Section III.A of the main text, physicians often have discretion
between PTCA and CABG when only one or two arteries are blocked but
lack this discretion when three or four arteries are blocked. Tables A4
and A5 below report results for the effect of apology laws on the proba-
bility of receiving CABG on one or two arteries and on three or four ar-
teries, respectively. Full apology laws have a smaller effect on the proba-
bility of receiving CABG on one or two arteries, and this effect is never
statistically significant. However, full apology laws have a weakly statisti-
cally significant effect on the probability of receiving CABG on three or
See Part III.B of the main text.
Instead of state fixed effects, I include hospital fixed effects. It is not possible to
include both state and hospital fixed effects, as they are perfectly collinear. Hospital
fixed effects are preferred to state fixed effects because they eliminate more
heterogeneity and generate more precisely estimated results. See Avraham &
Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 1 (discussing a preference for
hospital fixed effects over state fixed effects). However, I have estimated all of the
models reported below with state fixed effects with little change in the results.
6 To address the possibility that the rate of PTCA, the rate of CABG, length of
stay, and other outcomes are correlated within a particular state, I estimate standard
errors clustered at the state level. See Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We
Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates? 119 Q.J. EcoN. 249, 258 (2004) (noting that
clustering can address the problem of serial autocorrelation).
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four arteries in the regression that lacks other controls. These results are
not consistent with full apology laws simply decreasing the practice of de-
fensive medicine, as physicians have little discretion when choosing be-
tween CABG on three or four arteries and other treatments. Next, I add
state-specific time trends to the models as control variables. Including
these time trends, which can be different for each state to account for
differences in how treatments develop across individual states, ensures
that the apology law variables are not simply picking up a general move-
ment away from (or toward) CABG. Once time trends are included,
the statistically significant effect of full apology laws on the probability of
receiving CABG disappears, suggesting that this effect is not robust and
should be interpreted with skepticism.
Resource Use Results
Next, as explained in Section III.E.2, I test the robustness of the posi-
tive and statistically significant effects of apology laws on patients' lengths
of stay as reported in Table 5. I investigate the robustness of these results
in three ways. First, as with the CABG results, I add state-specific time
trends to account for the fact that there was a general decline in length
of stay between 1999 and 2011-these results are reported in Table A7.
The coefficients in the models without any control variables become in-
significant, but the coefficients in the models with controls remain highly
statistically significant. Second, because there is some (statistically insig-
nificant) evidence that apology laws influence the choice of treatment
and because length of stay can vary mechanically with choice of treat-
ment, I examine length of stay separately for patients who receive medi-
cal management, PTCA, and CABG-these results are reported in Table
A8. Both types of apology laws increase length of stay for patients who re-
ceive medical management, suggesting that the effect of apology laws in
increasing length of stay is not driven by treatment choice since medical
management patients receive the least intensive treatment. For PTCA pa-
tients, the positive effect of full apology laws is statistically significant, and
for CABG patients, partial apology laws have a statistically significant and
positive effect on length of stay.
Third, to ensure that the apology law variables are not simply picking
3278
up some pre-existing trend in length of stay, I estimate a model that
includes indicator variables for three years before, two years before, and
Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform, supra note 1 (including
state-specific linear time trends in their empirical models).
As Avraham & Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Refonn, supra note 1, explain, it
is possible that there are pre-existing trends in the outcome variable and that passage
of a tort reform is simply correlated with these pre-existing trends. If this is the case,
the effect attributed to apology laws here would simply reflect this correlation and
not a causal effect of apology laws. The models discussed here can address the
possibility that apology laws are simply correlated with these pre-existing trends.
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one year before the passage of an apology law-referred to as "leads."
The model also includes an indicator for the year the apology law was
enacted, one year after enactment, two years after enactment, three after
enactment, and four-plus years after enactment-referred to as "lags." To
reject the possibility that the apology law variables are simply picking up
pre-existing trends in the data, there must be a clear movement toward a
positive effect on length of stay following the passage of an apology law
but not before. Because this movement is more easily- visualized than
traced through a series of coefficients in a table, Figure Al reports the
coefficients for the leads and lags from a linear regression-the points
represent coefficient estimates and the lines represent the 10% confi-
dence intervals; There -is a7-general movement in the positivedirection
following the passage of an apology law, suggesting that the apology law
variables reported in the main results are not simply picking up pre-
existing trends in the data.
Quality of Care Results
Finally, I test the robustness of the results reported in Section III.E.3.
First, as with earlier models, I add a series of state-specific linear time
trends to control for a general change in the death rate across the time
period analyzed here-these results are reported in Table A9. With the
inclusion of these additional controls, the positive effect of full apology
laws on death rates becomes even stronger and more statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting that the results in the main text reflect an actual (and
perverse) effect of full apology laws on mortality. Next, to ensure that the
apology law variables are not simply picking up pre-existing trends in the
underlying data, I include a series of leads and lags in a regression model
just as I did when examining the length of stay results. Figure A2 reports
the coefficient estimates from this lead/lag analysis, and as with length of
stay, there is a general movement toward an increase in the probability of
death following the passage of a full apology law, though this movement
is not as clear as it was with length of stay.
FIGURES
Figure Al: Lead and Lag Effects of Apology Laws on Length of Stay
Panel A: Single Apology Law Variable
If the 90% confidence interval does not cross the "zero line," then an effect is
statistically significant.
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Apology Law Lead 3
Apology Law Lead 2
Apology Law Lead 1
Apology Law Enact Year
Apology Law Lag 1-
Apology Law Lag 2-
Apology Law Lag 3-
Apology Law Lag 4 Plus-
-.02
*
.02 .04 .06 .08
Panel B: Separate Apology Law Variables
Partial Apology Law Lead 3-
Full Apology Law Lead 3-
Partial Apology Law Lead 2-
Full Apology Law Lead 2-
Partial Apology Law Lead 1-
Full Apology Law Lead 1-
Partial Apology Law Actual-
Full Apology Law Actual-
Partial Apology Law Lag 1 -
Full Apology Law Lag 1-
Partial Apology Law Lag 2-
Full Apology Law Lag 2-
Partial Apology Law Lag 3-
Full Apology Law Lag 3-
Partial Apology Law Lag 4 Plus-




-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Notes: The coefficients and point estimates come from regressions that include a full
set of controls and mirror those reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5.
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Figure A2: Lead and Lag Effects of Apology Laws on Mortality
Panel A: Single Apology Law Variable
Apology Law Lead 3-
Apology Law Lead 2-
Apology Law Lead 1 -
Apology Law Enact Year-
Apology Law-Lag-1-
Apology Law Lag 2-
Apology Law Lag 3-




Panel B: Separate Apology Law Variables
Partial Apology Law Lead 3
Full Apology Law Lead 3
Partial Apology Law Lead 2-
Full Apology Law Lead 2
Partial Apology Law Lead 1-
Full Apology Law Lead 1
Partial Apology Law Actual
Full Apology Law Actual
Partial Apology Law Lag 1
Full Apology Law Lag 1
Partial Apology Law Lag 2
Full Apology Law Lag 2
Partial Apology Law Lag 3
Full Apology Law Lag 3
Partial Apology Law Lag 4 Plus-





Notes: The coefficients and point estimates come from regressions that include a full
set of controls and mirror those reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 6.
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MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 23D
TEX. CIv. PkAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1160
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.66.010
TENN. R. EVID. 409.1
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 677.082
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROc. § 10-920
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8C-1, 413
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.43
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63, § 1-1708.1H
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130
LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5
ME. REv. STAT. TuT. 24, § 2907
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.229
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-411.1
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1
735 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1901
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-1 1A
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 4318
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-1 ET SEQ.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.31
UTAH R. EvID. 409
VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 12, § 1912
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, RULE 409.5
NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 27-1201
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-04-12
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2841
MICH. COMP. IAWS ANN. § 600.2155
35 PA STAT. ANN. § 10228.3
Wis. STAT. § 904.14
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.544
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Full
Colorado 2003 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135
Connecticut 2005 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-184D
Arizona 2005 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605
Georgia 2005 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-416
South Carolina 2006 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190
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Notes: Data come from all patients with a principle diagnosis of Acute Myocardial
Infarction in the National Inpatient Sample.
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Table A4: Effect of Apology Laws on the Probability of Receiving CABG
(One or Two Arteries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partial
Apology Law 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Full Apology
Law 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Control




Observations 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339
R-squared 0.033 0.037 0.037 0.033 0.037 0.037
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
received CABG on one or two arteries. "Control variables" include an indicator varia-
ble for whether the patient was female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's
age; indicators for whether the patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private
insurance; and the constituent parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are
based on the diagnoses associated with a given patient. Also within "control varia-
bles" are a series of indicator variables for hospital type including: public, not-for-
profit, for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medium, and small. "Other Tort Reforms"
include an indicator for whether a state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap,
and an indicator for whether the following had been enacted: periodic payment re-
form, joint and several liability reform, punitive damages caps, and collateral source
rule reform. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects and are weighted
by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Robust standard errors corrected for
within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.
* statistically significant at the 10% level
** statistically significant at the 5% level
*** statistically significant at the 1% level
12752018]
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Table A5: Effect of Apology Laws on the Probability of Receiving CABG
(Three or Four Arteries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partial
Apology Law -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Full Apology
Law 0.007* 0.007 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Control




Observations 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339
R-squared 0.044. 0.052 0.052 0.044 0.052 0.052
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
received CABG on three or four arteries. "Control variables" include an indicator var-
iable for whether the patient was female; the age of the patient; the square of pa-
tient's age; indicators for whether the patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or
private insurance; and the constituent parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index,
which are based on the diagnoses associated with a given patient. Also within "con-
trol variables" are a series of indicator variables for hospital type including: public,
not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medium, and small. "Other Tort Re-
forms" include an indicator for whether a state had enacted a noneconomic damages
cap, and an indicator for whether the following had been enacted: periodic payment
reform, joint and several liability reform, punitive damages caps, and collateral
source rule reform. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects and are
weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Robust standard errors cor-
rected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.
* statistically significant at the 10% level
** statistically significant at the 5% level
*** statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table A6: Effect of Apology Laws on the Probability of Receiving CABG
With State Time Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Partial
Apology Law 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Full Apology
Law -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Control




Observations 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339 1,651,524 1,651,339 1,651,339
R-squared 0.068 0.080 0.080 0.068 0.080 0.080
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
received CABG. "Control variables" include an indicator variable for whether the pa-
tient was female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for
whether the patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the
constituent parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagno-
ses associated with a given patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indi-
cator variables for hospital type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching,
rural, large, medium, and small. "Other Tort Reforms" include an indicator for
whether a state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for
whether the following had been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint and several
liability reform, punitive damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. All regres-
sions include state-specific linear time trends, hospital fixed effects, and year fixed
effects. All regressions are weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS.
Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are
reported in parentheses.
* statistically significant at the 10% level
** statistically significant at the 5% level
*** statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table A7: Effect of Apology Laws on Length of Stay With State Time
Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.017 0.021** 0.020**
(0.000) (0.008) (0.008)
Partial
Apology Law 0.015 0.018** 0.018**
(0.000) (0.009) (0.009)
Full Apology
Law 0.029 0.037** 0.035**
(0.000) (0.015) (0.016)
Control




Observations 1,598,137 1,597,976 1,597,976 1,598,137 1,597,976 1,597,976
R-squared 0.079 0.203 0.203 0.079 0.203 0.203
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of length of stay. "Control
variables" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was female; the age of
the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the patient was cov-
ered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent parts of the
Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associated with a giv-
en patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator variables for hospi-
tal type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural, large, medium,
and small. "Other Tort Reforms" include an indicator for whether a state had enact-
ed a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the following had
been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint and several liability reform, punitive
damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. All regressions include state-specific
linear time trends, hospital fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All regressions are
weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Robust standard errors cor-
rected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.
* statistically significant at the 10% level
** statistically significant at the 5% level
*** statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table A8: Effect of Apology Laws on Length of Stay Across Procedure
Types
Panel A- Med.
Mgmt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.026** 0.031*** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Partial
Apology Law 0.024* 0.029** 0.024**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Full Apology
Law 0.038** 0.042** 0.023
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Observations 850,710 850,589 850,589 850,710 850,589 850;589
R-squared 0.095 0.186 0.186 0.095 0.186 0.186
Panel B: PTCA
Both Laws 0.009 0.015 0.015
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Partial
Apology Law 0.000 0.008 0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Full Apology
Law 0.048** 0.046** 0.047***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 599,395 599,364 599,364 599,395 599,364 599,364
R-squared 0.064 0.160 0.160 0.064 0.160 0.160
Panel C:
CABG
Both Laws 0.022** 0.029** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Partial Apolo-
gy Law 0.024** 0.030** 0.030**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Full Apology
Law 0.015 0.026 0.026
(0.033) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 161,315 161,306 161,306 161,315 161,306 161,306
R-squared 0.072 0.172 0.172 0.072 0.172 0.172
Control
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Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of length of stay. The regres-
sions in Panel A are limited to those patients that received medical management and
no intensive intervention. The regressions in Panel B include only those patients that
received PTCA. The regressions in Panel C include only those patients that received
CABG. "Control variables" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was
female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the
patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent
parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associat-
ed with a given patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator varia-
bles for hospital type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural,
large, medium, and small. "Other Tort Reforms" include an indicator for whether a
state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the fol-
lowing had been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint and several liability reform,
punitive damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. --All regressions include
hospital and year fixed effects and are weighted by the discharge weights included in
the NIS. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error
term are reported in parentheses.
* statistically significant at the 10% level
** statistically significant at the 5% level
*** statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table A9: Effect of Apology Laws on Mortality With State Time Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Laws 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Partial
Apology Law -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Full Apology
Law 0.009* 0.010** 0.011***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Control




Observations 1,650,016 1,649,831 1,649,831 1,650,016 1,649,831 1,649,831
R-squared 0.010 0.045 0.045 0.010 0.045 0.045
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the patient
died. "Control variables" include an indicator variable for whether the patient was
female; the age of the patient; the square of patient's age; indicators for whether the
patient was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance; and the constituent
parts of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which are based on the diagnoses associat-
ed with a given patient. Also within "control variables" are a series of indicator varia-
bles for hospital type including: public, not-for-profit, for-profit, teaching, rural,
large, medium, and small. "Other Tort Reforms" include an indicator for whether a
state had enacted a noneconomic damages cap, and an indicator for whether the fol-
lowing had been enacted: periodic payment reform, joint and several liability reform,
punitive damages caps, and collateral source rule reform. All regressions include
state-specific linear time trends, hospital fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All re-
gressions are weighted by the discharge weights included in the NIS. Robust stand-
ard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in pa-
rentheses.
* statistically significant at the 10% level
** statistically significant at the 5% level
*** statistically significant at the 1% level
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